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1	  
Introduction 
By the late 1960s as the United States war in Vietnam was raging and protests 
against it were growing larger, more citizens began to openly criticize the power and 
influence that the U.S. wielded in world affairs. A vocal part of the antiwar movement 
was comprised of protestors who viewed the U.S. as an imperialist power; they used the 
antiwar movement to protest the war and the pattern of U.S. influence in other nations’ 
affairs. During this time many of these anti-imperialists were also growing concerned 
with U.S. policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. government has had 
policies justifying intervention and the exertion of political and economic influence in 
this region since the early 1800s. During the Cold War political scientists dubbed this 
phenomenon of U.S. exertion of its own interests in other nations’ affairs as part of the 
U.S. sphere of influence.1 This was especially evident as the U.S. attempted to stop South 
America and Southeast Asia from falling under Communism and Soviet influence during 
the Cold War.  
While the war in Vietnam occupied the agenda of most anti-imperialists during 
the mid to late 1960s, the early 1970s brought a loss of momentum to the antiwar 
movement. As its activism began to decline, a group of anti-imperialists shifted their 
focus to Latin America with the fear that it was destined to become the “next Vietnam.” 
Beginning in 1970 this fear was heightened by the U.S. government’s hostility towards 
Salvador Allende, the democratically elected Marxist president in Chile. In 1971, a year 
after Allende was elected to office, Community Action on Latin America (CALA) an 
anti-imperialist group based in Madison, Wisconsin was founded. CALA focused its 
                                                
1 Susanna Hast, Spheres of Influence in International Relations: History, Theory and Politics, (Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2014), 
http://site.ebrary.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lib/umich/reader.action?docID=10821417&ppg=1, 6. 
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efforts on educating U.S. citizens, specifically in Wisconsin, about the problems of U.S. 
policy in Latin America. As the U.S.-Chilean relationship continued to deteriorate, it 
became clear that more needed to be done to address U.S. actions in Chile. In April 1972 
a new national organization, Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH), was founded at a CALA 
conference in order to focus solely on activism against U.S. interventions in Chile. This is 
the story of the solidarity movement in the U.S. with Allende’s Chile led by CALA and 
NICH from 1971 until September 11, 1973.  
The emergence of Community Action on Latin America (CALA) can be 
understood through the framework of earlier leftist anti-imperialist activism in the U.S. 
and the key ideologies of these activists. One central ideology for many anti-imperialists 
was dependency theory. This was an economic theory that had its roots in an earlier Latin 
American economic theory from the late 1940s and became prominent in the 1950s to 
70s. It served as an explanation on how developed nations keep underdeveloped nations 
in a state of perpetual subordination (or dependency). This theory added to activists’ 
understanding of the harmful nature of U.S. influence and intervention in underdeveloped 
countries. Dependency theory was popular amongst those who led the revival of radical 
activism against racial injustices and Cold War militarism in the 1960s. This group was 
classified as the new left and it laid the foundation for CALA’s activism. In this story, the 
understanding of new left activism is couched in a discussion of Fair Play for Cuba 
Committee (FPCC), an organization that stood in solidarity with Castro’s Cuban 
revolution in the early1960s. FPCC’s activism set a precedent of solidarity with a leftist 
government that the U.S. government opposed. The model of FPCC and its successes set 
the stage for CALA’s emergence as an anti-imperialist group focused on Latin American 
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causes. Later, leftwing activists of the Vietnam-era antiwar movement, insofar as they 
judged the war as a manifestation of U.S. imperialism, also directly influenced CALA. 
These leftist factions believed that the war in Vietnam had been a natural consequence of 
U.S. policy and imperialism. Growing out of this consciousness, CALA organized to 
ensure that there would not be another Vietnam in Latin America.  
The founders of CALA believed that if more citizens had known about U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, that the war could have been prevented. Thereby education was 
a core component of CALA’s mission as was its focus on community activism. CALA 
was based on the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s campus, but sought to engage the 
whole Madison community, not just the academic one. One way to engage the 
community was to draw connections between Wisconsin citizens to those of Chile and 
other Latin American nations in order to inspire an urgency to take action against U.S. 
interventions. CALA aimed to explore the effect that Allende’s nationalization of the 
Chilean copper industry had on the exploitation of the workers of the Wisconsin copper 
industry in rural Wisconsin in order to make the issue more relatable for the Madison 
community. As part of an effort to educate a larger crowd about events in Chile, CALA 
hosted a Crisis in Chile Conference at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in April 
1972 as Allende’s government faced growing opposition apparently fostered by the 
United States. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s national security advisor, feared that 
Allende’s victory would lead to an unprecedented spread of Communism in South 
America.2 Indeed, Allende and his coalition government, Unidad Popular (UP), soon 
became the Nixon administration’s main foreign target. In light of United States hostility 
                                                
2 Tanya Harmer, Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2011) 60. 
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towards Allende, CALA planned the conference to “promote interest in and knowledge 
about recent developments in Chile by bringing together Latin and North American 
scholars and members of the greater Madison and University communities.”3 The U.S. 
government and a few corporations’ plans to sabotage the Chilean government had 
recently been exposed in the U.S. media and CALA wanted to capitalize on this 
knowledge and continue educating people about the danger of an impending intervention.  
Over fifty academics, Latin American activists, politicians, and clergy from 
around the U.S., Canada and Chile were invited by CALA to join in this weekend of 
teaching and learning.4 The most notable part of this conference was the creation of Non-
Intervention in Chile (NICH), a group formed under the umbrella of CALA that aimed to 
rebut and block U.S. threats to Allende’s government. While education was also an 
essential component of NICH’s activism, most of its work had the character of direct 
action. NICH held demonstrations, circulated petitions and worked to educate the U.S. 
public about the merits of Allende’s government and the threat that U.S. corporations and 
government posed to Chile. Together, CALA and NICH continued educating U.S. 
citizens and protesting against the U.S. corporations that worked to subvert Allende’s 
government until the violent military coup occurred on September 11, 1973.5 Allende 
was killed and thus began a seventeen-year military dictatorship in Chile. In response, a 
significant movement of solidarity with Chile arose in the United States as a protest 
against the U.S. government’s support for the dictatorship and its blatant human rights 
                                                
3 Crisis Conference Chile PR material, 4/6/72, Folder 11, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on 
Latin America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
4 Chile Conference Address List, undated, Folder 10, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin 
America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
5 CALA Brochure, undated, Folder 9, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin America Records 
Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
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abuses. NICH was involved in this post-coup movement, but its mission was altered as a 
reaction to the new circumstances in Chile. Due to its size and prominence within the 
canon of 1970s activism, the post-coup solidarity movement is better known than the 
solidarity movement led by CALA-NICH during Allende’s presidency. Yet it was the 
pre-coup movement led by CALA-NICH, which set the stage for the post-coup 
movement’s quick mobilization and success.  
 A discussion of Allende’s path to presidency and his relationship with the U.S. 
government is necessary for an understanding of the significance of the pre-coup and 
post-coup solidarity movements. In 1933, a twenty-five year old Allende helped found 
the Chilean Socialist Party.6 “From 1952 on, Allende became a Socialist presidential 
candidate inspired by Marxist visions of a transformed world…and whose ultimate goal 
was a revolutionary one- a democratic road to socialism.”7 Despite the historic tensions 
between the Socialist and Communist parties, Allende believed that the way to obtain this 
peaceful socialism would be through a coalition of these two working class parties. The 
Socialist party had split in the early 1950s but in 1956 the Socialist party reunified and 
began an alliance with the Chilean Communist party (PCCh) to form a new coalition, 
Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP). Allende was chosen as the unified party’s presidential 
nominee for the 1958 election. Although he lost, this election was a turning point for 
Allende as it established his vision of democratic socialism as a legitimate one that had a 
chance to succeed.8 This political moment corresponded with Fidel Castro’s revolution in 
Cuba, which came the following year. The Cuban revolution “would transform politics 
                                                
6 Peter Winn, “Salvador Allende: His Political Life… and Afterlife,” Socialism and Democracy 19:3 
(2005): 134, doi:10.1080/08854300500258045. 
7 Ibid, 136. 
8 Ibid, 136-8; Jonathan Haslam, The Nixon Administration and the Death of Allende’s Chile (New York: 
Verso, 2005), 11. 
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throughout the region, upping the leftist ante, polarizing politics along ideological line 
and involving the United States in covert interventions in the politics of democratic 
countries like Chile to prevent ‘another Cuba’- or an Allende victory.” 9 The U.S.’s 
reaction to the Cuban revolution angered many and spurred a solidarity movement in the 
U.S. with Cuba, which would serve as a precursor for CALA. 
The success of the leftwing revolution in Cuba raised Chilean leftists’ hopes that 
Allende could succeed with a win in the 1964 presidential election. Contemporary 
Chilean scholar and politician, Heraldo Muñoz said, “the Cuban Revolution symbolized 
and synthesized the essential tenets of [the Socialist] party… Cuba constituted a 
nationalist, anti-imperialist, popular, anticapitalist and Latin American experience” that 
resonated with Allende’s party.10 This coupled with Allende’s strong showing in the 1958 
election scared the right wing parties who abandoned their candidates in favor of the 
more moderate candidate, Eduardo Frei, of the Christian Democrat party.11 Frei’s 
moderate reformist agenda was seen as the “lesser of two evils” and with the support of 
the right wing parties he was able to win the election.12 Once in power, Frei’s reforms 
were limited, which angered many leftists within the Christian Democrat party and 
caused many to leave the party to form a new one called Popular Action Unity Movement 
(MAPU). In attempts to keep the rest of the Christian Democrats together, left-leaning 
Radomiro Tomic, was chosen as the party’s candidate. Still, Tomic was too radical for 
the right wing parties to endorse, so they elected former Chilean president, Jorge 
                                                
9 Winn, 138. 
10 Harmer, 21. 
11 Margret Power, “The Engendering of Anticommunism and Fear in Chile’s 1964 Presidential Election,” 
Diplomatic History 32:5 (2008), 933 doi:10.111/j.1467-7709.2008.00735x. 
12 Ibid. 
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Alessandri, as their candidate.13 Allende’s advisors predicted that a split between the right 
and the Christian democrats would be an essential component for the possibility of 
victory for Allende. But in order to succeed, a broad coalition between left and center-left 
groups was necessary.14 This coalition, called the Unidad Popular (UP), was created in 
1969 and was comprised of Socialists, Communists and four non-Marxist parties, 
including MAPU, that were to the left and right of Allende’s political views. Allende 
would finally win the presidential election on September 4, 1970 under this coalition and 
become the first democratically elected Marxist president in Latin America. 
However, Allende’s victory was not an easy one. He won only 36.3 percent of the 
vote while the right wing National Party candidate, Alessandri, won 34.9 percent and 
Tomic won 27.8 percent.15 Since Allende did not win the majority of votes and 
Alessandri refused to concede the election, his victory needed approval by Congress. The 
U.S. government’s initial plan to ensure that Allende did not get the congressional votes 
was to bribe Christian Democratic congressmen to vote for Alessandri in exchange for 
political power and money from U.S. corporations in Chile. Once it was clear that the 
Christian Democrats would vote for Allende the U.S. devised a new plan at a meeting 
attended by Nixon and Kissinger. The idea was to kidnap the head of the military, 
General René Schneider, but make it appear as though it had been done by radical leftists 
in hopes that it would inspire a military coup against Allende. Yet the plan went awry and 
Schneider was killed during the kidnapping. Initially, the far-left group, Moviemiento de 
Izquierda Revolcionaria (MIR), was blamed but within days a retired general uncovered 
                                                
13 Winn, 141. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Haslam, 56. 
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the truth. The nation was shocked by the right wing violence, which created the necessary 
political pressure to secure Allende’s victory in the Congress.16  
This U.S. backed operation to try to stop Allende from coming to power was not 
the first instance of U.S. intervention in Chilean or Latin American politics. U.S. 
intervention in Chile was a product of Cold War ideology and of U.S. economic interests 
that dated back to before the Nixon administration. As Thomas G. Paterson wrote, 
President John Kennedy, “preached democracy, but in Latin America he sent military aid 
to the forces of oppression.”17 When it came to Latin America, protecting U.S. financial 
and ideological interests trumped the protection of democracy. Between 1962-64, in 
preparation for Allende’s election against Frei, the CIA funneled money into various 
media outlets, political groups and activist groups to stop Allende’s party from winning 
the election. The Kennedy and later Johnson administrations’ fear that Allende would 
nationalize the profitable copper industry was one factor that drove the decision to fund 
these groups.18  
While protecting economic interests was always on the forefront of the U.S. 
government’s mind, it was Cold War inspired ideological concerns about Allende and the 
UP that drove the U.S. government’s interest in intervention in Chile. Allende’s socialist 
government served as a major ideological threat to the U.S. war against Communism and 
the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration feared that Allende’s victory coupled with 
Castro’s rule in Cuba would lead to Communist victories throughout the South American 
                                                
16 Haslam 67-71;Winn, 142-143. 
17 Thomas G. Paterson, “Introduction: John F. Kennedy’s Quest for Victory and Global Crisis” in 
Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 6. 
18 Stephen G. Rabe, “Controlling Revolutions: Latin America, the Alliance for Progress and Cold War 
Anti-Communism,” in Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, ed. Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 116. 
9  
continent. This could also inspire and strengthen left-wing parties in Europe, creating a 
regional and global Communist crisis.19 Yet the democratic nature of Chile’s election 
made it difficult for the U.S. to oppose Allende openly because of the U.S. emphasis on 
global democracy. There was fear within the government that an overreaction to 
Allende’s election would strengthen him and the Chilean left while embarrassing the 
U.S.20 This led to the Nixon administration’s initial decision to covertly put pressure on 
the Allende government. A National Security Decision Memorandum issued on 
November 9, 1970 addressing the Chile situation ordered the U.S. to ‘prevent its [the 
Chilean government] consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to 
the United States and hemispheric interests.’”21 In July 1971, the UP began nationalizing 
the Chilean copper industry as part of Allende’s plan to free Chile from its economic 
dependency on the U.S. This was seen as “direct attack on U.S. economic interests” and 
Nixon retaliated by blocking Chile’s applications for bank loans.22  
The U.S. policy of Chilean “containment” also included an invisible credit 
blockade. This blockade decreased Chile’s capacity to import consumer and factory 
goods, which reduced Chilean industrial outputs and fueled inflation.23 The economic 
turmoil caused by the containment policy and the expenses of the nationalization process 
led to increased middle class support of the right wing parties and an overall exacerbation 
of social tensions.24 Historian Stephen Rabe argued that this middle class support was 
born out of the fear that a lower class revolution would result in even greater loss to 
                                                
19 Harmer, 60-61. 
20 Ibid, 68. 
21 Ibid, 69-70.  
22 Ibid, 110-111.  
23 Ibid, 93, 145; Richard E. Feinberg, “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende.” Latin American 
Perspectives 1,2 (1974), 35, doi: 10.1177/0094582X7400100204.  
24 Ibid.
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“their own privileges.”25 The U.S. aided the process of polarization both economically 
and socially, which helped fuel the conditions for enough domestic unrest that would 
justify a military intervention.26 As Kissinger said days after the coup, the U.S.’s covert 
policies towards Chile during Allende’s presidency did as much as possible to create the 
conditions for the military coup on September 11, 1973.27  
The U.S. solidarity movement against the junta government led by Augusto 
Pinochet grew rapidly after the fall of Allende’s democratic socialist government and his 
death during the coup.  During the height of the movement there were about one hundred 
groups with varying ideologies and strategies across the U.S. fighting for an end to U.S. 
support of Pinochet’s regime.28 Despite comprehensive scholarship on these groups and 
on the U.S.-Chilean relationship during Allende’s presidency, there has been almost no 
scholarship exploring the U.S. solidarity movement with Allende’s presidency.  
In Margaret Power’s article “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 
1970s,” she writes off the pre-coup movement as “small and primarily consisted of 
individuals and groups who supported the [UP] government and identified with the left. 
They were attracted by the UP’s commitment to democratic socialism, popular 
participation, and substantial improvements in the people’s standard of living.”29While 
most of the individuals involved in the pre-coup solidarity were leftists, her 
characterization fails to provide a complete account of their movement. Although the pre-
coup movement was smaller and less diverse than the post-coup movement but it played 
                                                
25 Rabe, 112. 
26 Feinberg, 35. 
27 Harmer, 220. 
28 Heidi Tinsman, Buying into the Regime: Grapes and Consumption in Cold War Chile and the United 
States, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 179.  
29 Margaret Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American 
Perspectives 36:6, (Sage Publications, Inc., 2009), 47 doi: 10.1166/0094582X09350763. 
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a significant role in enabling the quick mobilization of the latter movement and in 
influencing 1970s activism as a whole. CALA-NICH was the largest group dedicated to 
Chilean solidarity before the coup and had access to resources and infrastructure that was 
instrumental for the immediate response to the coup. NICH would remain a strong 
presence in the post-coup movement, as the movement continued to mobilize people 
against U.S. support for the Pinochet regime in the following years. CALA-NICH’s 
influence was not limited to the Chilean solidarity movement; the 1970s was marked by a 
form of activism that was distinctly focused on corporate power and responsibility in the 
global world. CALA-NICH’s anti-imperialist activism was intrinsically anti-corporate 
and its campaigns against corporate injustices in Chile were on the forefront of this trend 
of activism that would carry on throughout the decade and into the 1980s. While CALA-
NICH never reached the scope of the post-coup movement its role as a Latin American-
focused anti-imperialist group was profound and deserves a spot in the canon of radical 




















Chapter One: Anti-Imperialism and the New Left 
The renewal of vocal anti-imperialist activism in the 1960s set the stage for 
CALA’s founding in 1971. With the death toll rising in the Vietnam war, protestors took 
the streets calling for an end to the war. Anti-imperialists groups were a significant part 
of that antiwar movement protesting not just the war but also the U.S. policies that 
created the situation in Vietnam. These were the same interventionist policies that had led 
to a failed military invasion of Cuba shortly after Fidel Castro took power in 1961. Led 
by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), the solidarity movement in the U.S. with 
Cuba was influential in opening up the path for Cold War era protests against U.S. 
foreign policy and for the antiwar in Vietnam protests that would occur a few years later. 
Inspired by new left ideology, those who protested against U.S. policies towards Cuba 
and Vietnam understood that these incidents were not anomalies but rather the result of 
U.S. imperialism. Many of the founders of CALA had been directly involved in the 
antiwar in Vietnam movement. As that movement began to decline in the early 1970s 
these anti-imperialists shifted their focus to Latin America in an attempt to prevent 
“another Vietnam.” It was the political and social developments of the anti-imperialism 
movements in the 1960s that helped usher in CALA’s form of Latin America focused 
anti-imperialism in the summer of 1971.  
CALA’s founding was the direct result of a proposal passed at an advisory 
conference on Latin America at Cornell University in March 1971. The conference 
brought professors, campus ministers and other university-affiliated individuals who were 
concerned with U.S. policies in Latin America together to brainstorm a remedy to the 
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deteriorating U.S.-Latin American relationship.30 The proposal came from the United 
Presbyterian Church’s committee on Inter-American Concerns and a national 
organization of several denominations of campus ministries, the United Ministries of 
Higher Education’s (UMHE) Internationalization Committee. These were mostly campus 
affiliated religious groups that were concerned about U.S. policies surrounding Latin 
America. They proposed to create centers of Latin American Policy Study at the 
University of Wisconsin, University of Texas, Stanford and Cornell, for the academic 
year of 1971-72 in order to educate U.S. citizens about the U.S.-Latin American 
relationship.31 CALA was set up as this center of policy study with grant money from 
Protestant and Catholic agencies, was able to immediately hire two staff members, 
University of Wisconsin graduate, Al Gedicks and history graduate student, Bruce 
Vandervort.32  
The members of CALA envisioned that their new organization would educate the 
Madison community about the problematic aspect of U.S. economic involvement in Latin 
America and garner support for movements in Latin America that were fighting against 
U.S. imperialism.33 This new organization was made up of “students, clergy, Latinos, and 
members of the Madison community.” Many of the Latino members were Chilean 
graduate students who planned to return to Chile and support the Unidad Popular (UP) 
                                                
30 A Proposal to M.C.M Concerning a Center for Latin American Policy Study, undated, Folder 1, Box 1, 
Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, 
Wisconsin Historical Society, 1; “Community Action on Latin America,” Ibero-American Newsletter 2,1 
(Fall 1971): 6. 
31 A Proposal to M.C.M Concerning a Center for Latin American Policy Study, CALA Records Part 1, 1; 
University Ministries and Latin American Policy Study, October 1970, Folder 1, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, 
Community Action on Latin America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin 
Historical Society, 1. 
32 “Community Action on Latin America,” Ibero-American Newsletter 2,1 (Fall 1971), 6. 
33 Community Action On Latin America. Records. 1971-1976, undated, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, Community 
Action on Latin America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
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government after their education.34The Chileans who joined CALA “understood [the] 
major threat from [the] U.S. [and] wanted to…acquire skills to be of direct assistance,” to 
stop the “mechanism in the U.S. for American imperial aggression.”35 CALA was not 
solely interested in liberating Latin Americans from “the patterns of U.S. domination” it 
was also worried about the influence that corporate interests played in U.S. foreign policy 
matters.36   
Dependency Theory and Anti-Imperialism 
CALA’s focus on the negative effects of U.S. economic involvement in Latin 
American stemmed from a prominent Latin American economic theory. Dependency 
theory was developed in the 1950s to explain the persistent poverty and 
underdevelopment of Latin American countries. It partially emerged in response to the 
insufficient explanation of underdevelopment put forth by the dominant modernization 
theory. Modernization theory related economic development to the stages of 
industrialization. It asserted that the poverty of underdeveloped countries was connected 
to technological underdevelopment. Further industrialization and the involvement of 
developed nations would end underdevelopment and alleviate poverty in these nations.37 
Dependency theorists argued that the modernization theory failed to address 
research that showed how “economic activity in the richer countries often led to serious 
economic problems in poorer countries.”38 One of the basic premises of dependency 
theory was the idea that capitalism perpetuates inequality, which can be understood 
                                                
34 Ibid; Al Gedicks, Interview with Al Gedicks. Phone. Fairfax, VA, 6/19/15.  
35 Ibid. 
36 CALA Brochure, CALA Records Part 1.  
37 Vincent Ferraro, “Dependency Theory: An Introduction,” In The Development Economics Reader, ed. 
Giorgio Secondi (London: Routledge, 2008), https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/depend.htm.  
38 Ibid. 
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through an exploration of the exporting and importing system. The resources of poor 
Latin American countries were extracted and then exported to developed nations where 
they were manufactured into various products and then sold back to the Latin American 
countries at a higher price. Under this model, Latin American countries were always 
behind because the cost of importing was higher than the money made from exporting the 
resources originally. Dependency theorists were indicting the system of capitalism; they 
saw it as the problem, not the solution for underdevelopment in Latin America 
countries.39  
 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s dependency theory continued to develop and 
became prominent among leftists intellectuals. Monthly Review, a socialist magazine 
founded in 1949, published several pieces on dependency theory and the problems that it 
created in Latin America. In September 1966 Andre Gunder Frank, an economics 
professor, published an article in Monthly Review entitled “The Development of 
Underdevelopment.” In this article he discussed the euro-centricity of the current 
“theoretical categories and guides to development policy” and how they were not suitable 
for understanding Latin American development.40 
Gunder Frank pointed to the colonial history of Latin America as the foundation 
for this perpetual underdevelopment. He argues that the city “was founded by the 
Conqueror [the Spanish and Portuguese] to serve the same ends that it still serves today; 
to incorporate the indigenous population into the economy brought and developed by that 
Conqueror and his descendants. The regional city was an instrument of conquest and is 
                                                
39 Ibid.  
40 Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review 18, 4 (September 
1966): 17, doi:10.14452/MR-018-04-1966-08.  
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still today an instrument of domination.”41During the colonial period Latin America cities 
housed the more integrated mestizo population, where as the more discriminated against 
indigenous communities lived in the rural outskirts. Citing the National Indian Institute of 
Mexico, Gunder Frank argued that this created a “metropolis-satellite” relationship that 
involves an “economic and social interdependence…and that the provincial metropolis 
‘by being centers of intercourse are also centers of exploitation.’”42 These cities in Latin 
America then became “satellites” to the Spanish and Portuguese “metropolises” leading 
the Latin America nations to be the exploited, disadvantaged nations on the world 
economic stage.43While modernization theory pointed to isolation from developed 
nations as an explanation for underdevelopment, Gunder Frank and dependency theorists 
argued the contrary. It was precisely the interactions with the capitalistic world economic 
system and the exploitation that followed which perpetuated the underdevelopment of 
these nations.44 
Imbedded in Gunder Frank’s analysis that the historic systems of colonialism and 
contemporary capitalism created underdevelopment in Latin America was the critique of 
imperialism as the system that continued to perpetuate it.  For most dependency theorists 
the story of underdevelopment cannot be told without also implicating the system of 
imperialism. In 1970, Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano’s Monthly Review piece “Latin 
America and the Theory of Imperialism” said, “Latin American countries have never 
controlled their own internal markets nor the destination of the economic surplus 
generated by their productive forces. The control of their basic resources has always been 
                                                
41 Ibid, 19.  
42 Ibid, 20.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, 23.  
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in foreign hands.”45 He argues that even after Latin American countries gained their 
independence, and in some cases industrialized, they remained dependent on Western 
nations through investments and the market presence of foreign corporations.46 Contrary 
to the modernization assertion that interaction with developed nations was the most 
beneficial way to end underdevelopment, Gunder Frank, Galeano and many other 
dependency theorists believed that economic independence from imperial powers was the 
solution.  
Gunder Frank argued that Chile epitomized this notion of imperialist “satellite 
underdevelopment.” A report written by Al Gedicks, one of the founders of CALA, 
expanded upon this point. Gedicks had just graduated from the University of Wisconsin 
when CALA was founded where he had been a member of SDS. Gedicks’ urgency to 
prevent another Vietnam in Latin America coupled with his education “during the 1960s 
about the role of U.S. corporations and the military in the maintenance of an American 
empire” led him to the position of research coordinator of CALA in 1971.47 Much of his 
research focused on the connection between the expropriation of Chilean copper and its 
effect on the Wisconsin copper industry.48 This report was published after the coup in the 
leftist Review for Radical Political Economics but it was the result of the research 
Gedicks’ conducted during his employment at CALA. He found that the U.S.-owned 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company and Kennecott Copper Corporation made $2,011 
million in profits from Chilean copper mines from 1915-1968. Of those $2,011 million 
made from extracting Chilean resources, only $738 million was reinvested into the 
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Chilean economy.49 When Allende nationalized the copper industry in the summer of 
1971, he “declared the event Chile’s ‘second independence,’ referring to the achievement 
of economic independence that has been denied [to] Chile since its political break from 
Spain in 1818.”50The story of the Chilean copper industry showed the limitations of 
economic theories that ignored the adverse effects that capitalism and imperialism had on 
formerly colonized nations in Latin America.  
Although dependency theory was developed directly in relation to Latin America, 
it gradually expanded to other parts of the developing world, especially Africa. While 
dependency theory was not usually applied towards Vietnam or other parts of Southeast 
Asia, the theory’s anti-imperialist ideology was directly related to the contemporary war 
in Vietnam. The antiwar movement was comprised of a broad coalition of individuals and 
groups who had varying political ideologies, yet an influential faction of this movement 
was motivated by anti-imperialism. Yet before the Vietnam War, this connection between 
dependency theory and anti-imperialism manifested itself in the solidarity movement in 
the U.S. with the Castro’s Cuban Revolution. 
Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the New Left  
 The Cuban revolution was a turning point for anti-imperialist activism in the U.S. 
It set the precedence for opposing U.S. imperial policies during the Cold War era and it 
was an important component for the rise of new left activism. Both of these elements 
would set the stage for CALA’s form of activism that would emerge a decade later. 
Dubbed the new left in the 1960s, this movement had began to emerge in the 1950s as 
more intellectually based “left wing insurgency” that would be rooted in participatory 
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democracy and non-violence.51 It focused on racial injustice and U.S. militarism as its 
core issues and sympathized with countries that were “emerging from colonialism to 
independence.”52Unlike earlier movements, the new left identified students and African-
Americans as the demographics most likely to create this radical social change.53 While 
the civil rights group, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and 
antiwar movement group, SDS, are more notably associated with the new left, the Cuban 
solidarity movement played an important role in the emergence of the new left.  
By January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro’s movement had overthrown the Cuban dictator 
Fulgencio Batista and had officially begun governing in Cuba but the revolution was far 
from over. According to Aviva Chomsky, “’the revolution’ refers to a 50-year process of 
consciously creating a new society with many different phases” in Cuba.54 Castro’s 
revolution relied on the need for populist social policies to bring about political change. 
He “declared that a government’s authority rested on the consent of the governed.”55 
Despite the end of McCarthyism, the stronger association between the Cuban revolution 
and socialism had made it politically “suicidal” to openly support Castro’s revolution.56 
The negative ramifications of supporting Castro’s revolution deterred some leftist support 
for the movement, as did the Marxist-Leninist conception of “adventurism.” Adventurism 
was the idea of violent action or revolution that was not linked to deep-rooted thought or 
ideology. Many older Marxist-Leninist leftists feared that Castro’s movement fit the mold 
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of adventurism. Despite their alignment with many of the Cuban revolution’s ideals, 
including anti-imperialism, those leftits chose not to join in solidarity with Cuba. 
Castro’s movement also isolated that particular group of leftists because it did not 
identify itself within the already existing Marxist-Lenin revolutionary mold.57 “This older 
left model of programmatic, party-based revolution was anathema to the Cuban with their 
populist, youthful origins and their frank assertion of political eclecticism.”58 In contrast, 
it was exactly these youthful and populist aspects that attracted many new leftists to the 
stand in solidarity with Castro. The commitment to anti-imperialism and efforts to end 
underdevelopment through the lens of dependency theory was imbedded in the 
emergence of the new left’s ideology and in the Castro’s revolutionary struggle. Despite 
the Cold War paradigm that support for a socialist government meant inherent support of 
the Soviet Union and anti-U.S. sentiments; these new left activists were skeptical of both 
the United States and the Soviet Union, two of the world’s superpowers. Instead, new 
leftists aligned themselves with the “Third World.” They viewed socialism and socialist 
revolutions as movements rooted in self-determination and as tools of “rapid economic 
development” for underdeveloped nations.59 
While the solidarity with Cuba movement in the U.S. was mostly composed of 
new left activists, members from various parts of the political spectrum were involved. 
The initial aim of the movement was to offset hostility towards Castro’s government and 
to oppose the U.S. government’s support for counter-revolutionary groups in Cuba.60 
Those in solidarity with Cuba became an influential component of new left activism 
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whereas some of the other leftists began straying into the liberal tent that supported 
intervention and perpetuation of dependency in Latin America. 
 Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) was the primary group associated with the 
solidarity movement and it was comprised of a diverse group of individuals from across 
the country. Many of the student activists from FPCC, “would in the next decade play 
leading roles in the antiwar movement and the revival of the intellectual left.”61 FPCC’s 
role as a new left activist group helped spark involvement in the antiwar movement and 
subsequently the Chilean solidarity movement. These movements were centered on the 
ideals of anti-imperialism and in terms of FPCC, on the economic concerns of 
underdeveloped nations. As Doug Rossinow explained, “in sum, virtually every current 
of the later sixties upsurge briefly cohered around the defense of Cuba.”62 
FPCC was founded by a small group of anti-imperialists who were reacting to the 
quickly deteriorating relations between Cuba and the U.S. in 1960. These individuals 
were angered by the U.S. diplomatic approach to Cuba and wanted to stop the negative 
manipulation of Cuba’s image in the media. As stated in FPCC’s original mission from 
April 1960, its goal was “to disseminate truth, to combat untruth, to publish the factual 
information which the U.S. mass media suppress, which the American public has the 
right to know.”63 FPCC saw the U.S. government and media’s distortion of the Cuban 
revolution as an “not merely a grave injustice to the Cuban people…but a serious threat, 
as well, to the free traditions of our own people, our nation, our Hemisphere.”64 FPCC 
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envisioned that their efforts to disseminate the truth about the Cuban revolution would 
help restore positive diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Castro’s Cuba.65  
Prompted by a trade deal made in February 1960 by June 1960 the Eisenhower 
administration had become openly hostile to the Cuban government. Cuba had agreed to 
provide sugar to the Soviet Union in exchange for oil and manufactured goods and in 
response, U.S. oil companies in Cuba refused to process the Soviet oil. In June, Cuba 
expropriated the oil industry and by October of that year the U.S. had declared an 
economic embargo on Cuba.66 This series of events led to the U.S. decision to end all 
diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. This break in relations in turn radicalized 
FPCC. Chapters began popping up on college campuses and all over the country as the 
ideology shifted to become more centrally aligned with new left ideals.67This shift was 
caused by the increased radicalization of the Cuban revolution and by “the dynamic of 
[FPCC] being that strange new thing, an independent radical membership 
organization.”68FPCC was unlike earlier solidarity organizations that took the form of 
coalitions or large organizations associated with a specific party. It was not associated 
with any political party and therefore attracted a diverse array of individuals committed 
to new left ideals and solidarity with the Cuban revolution.69 
One of the main leaders of FPCC, Saul Landau, was the head of the new left’s 
main intellectual journal, Studies on the Left, and a student at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Landau and the other students who published Studies were socialist 
club leaders who had formerly been in the youth wing of the Communist Party. From the 
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Communist Party, they brought an anti-imperialist viewpoint with them to their work in 
the new left and in FPCC.70 Through FPCC, Landau organized a Christmas tour of Cuba 
for North American students in December of 1960. Over 326 students made the trip to 
Cuba that December one month before the U.S. government banned all travel to the 
island. Despite warnings and attempts from the U.S. State Department and other 
governmental officials to shut it down, the trip was a success. Those students returned to 
school in the January 1961 with first hand knowledge of the revolution. This sparked an 
upsurge in the formation of chapters, rallies, newspaper articles and other forms of 
student activism across the U.S. Cuba had become a hot-button topic on college 
campuses across the country.71 
In the late 1950s, before the big student trip to Cuba, Studies published an issue 
dedicated to the Cuban revolution that emphasized the importance of solidarity 
movements in the U.S. Similar to the original mission of FPCC, the issue directly linked 
support of Castro’s revolution with support of a truly democratic U.S. society.72 New left 
activists viewed the socialism of the Cuban revolution as an inspiration for social change 
within the U.S. It was not Castro’s specific plan that appealed to these activists it was his 
concepts such as universal healthcare that these activists felt were necessary and inspiring 
for U.S. society.73  
Other influential new leftists such as C. Wright Mills, a radical Columbia 
University professor and FPCC member, published writings in support of solidarity with 
Cuba. He argued that if U.S. students did not view the lessons from Cuban revolution as 
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an opportunity to make real political change within the U.S. then they would “pale in 
comparison to their contemporaries.”74 In November 1960, Mills published, Listen, 
Yankee!, a book about his firsthand experience with the revolution based on interviews 
with rebels, intellectuals, journalists, government officials and with Castro himself. The 
book was written in first person from the point of view of a Cuban rebel addressing a 
“Yankee.” Mills wrote, “Our country, our Cuba, it was simply an economic colony of the 
U.S. corporations until our revolution…Our revolution is not about your fight with 
Russia, or about Communism, or Hemispheric Defense, or any of all that: all those words 
came later, partly forced down our throat by your government and your monopolies.”75 
Mills was and is seen as one of the most influential thinkers of the new left. Yet Listen 
Yankee! was the respected radical intellectual’s most controversial work and many of his 
contemporary ivy-league scholars were furious about his support of the revolution.76 
Regardless, his effective writing in the non-academic style “did what it set out to do: it 
caused people to listen. Mills put the intellectuals’ formerly private dissent over Cuba 
into the mainstream and made it acceptable perhaps even fashionable to consider the 
Cuban point of view.”77 Mills also alienated many liberals who had shifted towards 
support for the counter-revolution, a view that was aligned with President Kennedy’s 
vision of continued intervention in Latin America.78 
The Christmas trip to Cuba and the support of Mills and various other prominent 
intellectuals all helped the growth of FPCC during its first year. By early 1961 FPCC 
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reported 7,000 members, forty student chapters and twenty-seven non-campus based 
chapters. From late 1960 to early 1961 these chapters engaged in typical activist tactics 
such as film screenings, speaker, fundraisers, protests and various other events to educate 
people about the revolution in Cuba.79 
 During the height of FPCC’s momentum, the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow 
Castro at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 would mark the beginning of FPCC’s decline and 
would set the stage for future anti-imperialists and new left activism. Beginning in March 
1960, the CIA and the U.S. government created, funded and trained a counter-
revolutionary army comprised of Cuban exiles living in the U.S. in preparation for the 
Bay of Pigs invasion. The army trained in Florida, Panama and Guatemala and on April 
17, 1961 they landed on Playa Girón in Cuba. Yet with little help on the ground, the rebel 
group was defeated by Castro’s military in just three days. This failed attempt to 
overthrow Castro’s government strengthened support for the Cuban revolution in both 
Cuba and in the U.S. amongst those who had previously been sympathetic but not vocally 
supportive of the movement.80 The overt operation, and worse its failure, generated 
significant attention in the U.S. and brought people out to the front lines with FPCC. The 
solidarity that FPCC had generated in earlier years was an important precursor for the 
mobilization of the protests that occurred in response to the Bay of Pigs. FPCC protests 
sprang up in cities all across the country from April 17 until the end of the invasion. 
Although these protests brought out individuals of all ages, it was the students who were 
at the forefront of these demonstrations.81  
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While the FPCC membership and protests never generated as much support as the 
later movement against the Vietnam war did, FPCC “altered the domestic political 
landscape, producing the first publicly visible dissent over imperial politics since the 
beginning of the Cold War.”82 These protests created the space for antiwar activists to 
speak out against U.S. policies of imperialism and economic intervention in later years. 
The Bay of Pigs protests were the largest protests against the U.S. government since the 
Cold War had begun.83 These protests allowed people to openly criticize the actions the 
U.S. government without the accusations of being anti-American, which set the stage for 
further demonstrations against the government. 
Although Mills and a handful of other academics were already associated with the 
new left, the majority of academics did not support the Cuban revolution. Despite this, 
the overt actions of the U.S. government at the Bay of Pigs had created an overwhelming 
sense among intellectuals that U.S. intervention in Cuba was wrong.84 This response was 
part of the academic community’s slow shift towards the left in the 1960s, which would 
play a large role in the later antiwar in Vietnam movement. FPCC continued to exist after 
the Bay of Pigs but once the protests died down and momentum was lost the organization 
began to fade away. Van Gosse argues that by late 1961 FPCC “began to enter the half-
life, neither defunct nor active in any consequential sense.”85 After the embarrassment of 
the Bay of Pigs the urgency around Cuba died because it was clear that the U.S. would 
not try another overt intervention. It also became more difficult to publically support 
Castro’s as he grew closer to the Soviet Union and declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. 
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Additionally, the activism around race relations in the South became a priority for many 
leftist activists.86  
Although the Cuban solidarity movement ended in the early 1960s it laid the 
groundwork for future radical politics in the U.S. including the anti-imperialist groups of 
the anti-Vietnam war movement. FPCC paved the way for dissent against U.S. 
imperialism during the Cold War and showed the government that there were U.S. 
citizens who would not tolerate U.S. imperialism or economic intervention. These young 
activists would continue to bring their new left ideals into later organizing and solidarity. 
It was FPCC and the Cuban solidarity movement that paved the way for antiwar activists 
and eventually for the activists in Madison, WI who decided that they could no longer 
stay silent on the U.S.’s policies towards Salvador Allende and the Chilean revolution.  
The Antiwar Movement 
Overt U.S. interventions in foreign countries, such as the Bay of Pigs and the 
Vietnam War, made it easier to mobilize U.S. citizens to demonstrate against the 
government’s actions. Yet there were groups and individuals calling for an end to U.S. 
interventions in Cuba and Vietnam before these disasters occurred. The FPCC existed 
before the Bay of Pigs and critiques of U.S. actions in Southeast Asia existed before the 
war. In June 1954, about a decade before the escalation of U.S. military involvement in 
Vietnam and six years before the creation of FPCC, the Monthly Review published an 
article warning about an impending crisis in Vietnam. The article “What Every American 
Should Know About Indo-China” written by Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, the 
magazine’s founders and editors, exposed the hypocrisy of the Cold War mentality as it 
stood in relation to the French rule in Vietnam. They argued that the U.S. government 
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could dislike Communism but since the Vietnamese people wanted a Communist 
government it should be their choice to elect one. “Are we going to take the position that 
anti-Communism justifies anything, including colonialism, interference in the affairs of 
other countries and aggression?”87Huberman and Sweezy viewed the U.S. government’s 
fighting Communism against the wishes of the Vietnamese people as a direct violation of 
the founding principles of the U.S.88 This idea that U.S. imperialism was a force that 
inherently hindered developing nations as well as U.S. democracy became a trope for 
new left activism.  
Radical leftists were among the earliest critics of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.  
The ideas espoused in Huberman and Sweezy’s article became more visible in U.S. 
society first through the FPCC and the new left’s growth in the early 1960s then more 
notably with certain groups in the antiwar movement.89 It was within the ideological vein 
of anti-imperialism as activism geared towards the liberation of developing nations as a 
means of also liberating the U.S. that CALA was founded. This critique of U.S. 
imperialism was well founded because of “a readiness to use military force, especially 
where communism or socialism of any kind was concerned, was in fact a hallmark of 
mainstream liberalism in the 1950s and 1960s.”90Similar to the distrust of the liberal 
vision of Latin American that drove many FPCC activists to action, the anti-imperialists 
of the antiwar movement saw liberals as committed to imperialism and suppression of 
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Communism by any means necessary in Vietnam. This view grew stronger as the liberal 
president, Johnson, escalated the war.91  
In August 1964, a U.S. ship USS Maddox was reportedly attacked on two 
different occasions by North Vietnamese ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although it is now 
known that these attacks did not occur, the Gulf of Tonkin incidents led to the passing of 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in Congress. This bill gave Johnson the power to “take all 
necessary measures to repel any armed attacks against the forces of the United States and 
to prevent further aggression.”92 In early 1965 the U.S. began Operation Rolling Thunder, 
an airstrike campaign and by April it had begun an escalation of U.S. military presence in 
Vietnam. After April the number of troops being sent over increased rapidly for the next 
few years.  
As seen by the Sweezy and Huberman’s article from 1954, there was opposition 
to U.S. intervention long before the escalation of the war in 1965 but the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident was a catalyst for the growth of the antiwar movement.93 Historian Tom Wells 
argues that it was in December 1964, four months after the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
that the idea for the first national action against the war in Vietnam would come into 
fruition.94 The event was planned for April 17, 1965 and 20,000 people would gather in 
Washington D.C. to take part in the largest peace demonstration in U.S. history to date. It 
was Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an influential new left activist group that 
organized this demonstration.95  
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While FPCC facilitated the creation of the new left, SDS one of the main activist 
groups associated with that movement. SDS was born out of a socialist student 
organization and was started in 1960 at the University of Michigan. It was in 1962 when 
that the group officially adopted its manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, at a national 
SDS conference that the organization began growing on campuses across the nation.96 
This statement excited leftist students across the country as it declared that radical social 
change would be rooted in participatory democracy and could only be accomplished by 
working both inside and outside of mainstream institutions. Just as Castro had inspired 
FPCC activists in his declaration that government only works if the citizens of the nation 
consent to their government, SDS called for citizens to share “in the social decisions 
determining the quality and direction of his [their] life.”97 SDS was heavily inspired by 
Mills’s work and called for the creation a true democracy in the U.S. based on domestic 
racial equality that was inherently linked to support for the developing nations.98 At the 
demonstration in April 1965, the SDS president Paul Potter argued that the system that 
was perpetuating both the war in Vietnam and the oppression and disenfranchisement of 
African Americans in the South must be brought down. While Potter refused to use name 
the system as capitalism and imperialism because he saw them as antiquated, later radical 
antiwar activists embraced those terms when referring to the perpetuation of inequality.99  
SDS’s demonstration in April 1965 was just one of the many actions that were 
organized by students or on campuses across the country that year. On March 24 the first 
teach-in about the Vietnam War took place at the University of Michigan. Over three 
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thousand people showed up to this all night event that was organized by thirty professors 
at the University. SDS member Carl Oglesby wrote, “the stroke of genius out there in 
Michigan…put the debate on the map for the whole academic community.” Ann Arbor’s 
teach-in had a widespread effect and within the next few months over a hundred other 
teach-ins had been organized on campuses across the country. Over thirty thousand 
people attended the teach-in at the University of California in Berkeley.100  
By the end of 1965, SDS had shifted their tactics away from education and teach-
ins towards civil disobedience through large protests and demonstrations.101As the war 
continued to escalate there was a change in military draft policy in February 1966. Before 
students had been exempt from the draft, now based on class rankings the university 
determined student eligibility. Through SDS protests against the ranking system, students 
became more aware of the university system’s complicity in the war and all that the war 
stood for.102 The momentum generated by all these events on campuses translated into 
increased support for SDS. SDS grew five times its size between 1965 and 1966, from 
3,000 members to 15,000. And by 1967 they had doubled their number from the year 
before, reporting 30,000 members.103 
As the war in Vietnam continued to escalate in the mid to late 1960s and affect 
the lives of many U.S. citizens, the antiwar movement became much more diverse. Until 
1967, SDS and other leftists who had been calling for the downfall of imperialism and 
capitalism as the way to end the war had been a prominent presence in the anti-war 
movement. Many of the newer liberal activists saw Vietnam as an exceptional situation in 
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U.S. history and were calling for an end to what they deemed a mistake. For new leftists, 
viewing Vietnam as a mistake was a mischaracterization of the war. They saw Vietnam 
as the most recent example, albeit an extreme one, of the pre-existing pattern of U.S. 
foreign policy.104 For SDS, what happened in Vietnam was part of a larger story about 
Cuba and the many other countries in the developing world where the U.S. had acted 
against its own values in favor of corporate interests and Cold War ideology. Oglesby 
explained “these interventions were made in order to quell the rising tide of 
anticolonialism around the world and thus maintain an ‘empire’ from which U.S. elites 
derived concrete benefits.”105Vietnam was not a mistake and SDS wanted to show the 
U.S. government and people that the whole system needed to come down or else another 
Vietnam was inevitable. 
  SDS began to decline and lose its influence in the movement in the late 1960s, 
which was followed by the whole antiwar movement’s decline in the early 1970s. By 
1970 Nixon had begun withdrawing troops and engaged in attempts to end the war 
through his policy of “Vietnamization.”106 These developments made the antiwar 
movement less urgent for many who opposed the war but were not avowed anti-
imperialists. Between Nixon’s de-escalation of the war and his engagement of détente 
with the Soviet Union and China it appeared that the U.S. was heading towards a new era 
devoid of Cold War attitudes and into one of global cooperation. For those who 
subscribed to the liberal notion that Vietnam was just a mistake these developments made 
demonstrations and protests seem unnecessary. Yet the anti-imperialists were not 
impressed and while the antiwar movement as a whole declined greatly in 1970 many 
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radical activists remained active until the last troops had been withdrawn from Vietnam. 
Even then they joined other movements to address the continued global and domestic 
injustices that the system, which helped create Vietnam, continued to perpetrate. It was in 
this moment of Vietnamization and the loss of motivation around the antiwar movement 
that CALA emerged as a response to the liberal notion that Vietnam as just a mistake. Al 
Gedicks, a founder of CALA, said that CALA was an “outgrowth of consciousness of the 
anti-imperialist games in Vietnam” and there was an understanding that once Vietnam 
was over the heat would shift to other developing countries.107 CALA identified Latin 
America as the next victim of U.S. imperialism and started organizing to prevent another 
Vietnam in that region. 
 Growing out of the still existing antiwar movement, CALA set out to educate and 
inform U.S. citizens about the U.S. government and corporations’ problematic actions in 
Latin America. On a flyer for a Latin American Speakers Bureau sponsored by CALA 
they wrote, “it was once said that war in Vietnam would not have been possible if the 
structure, function and motion of the U.S. foreign policy establishment had been a matter 
of public knowledge.”108 The activists who founded CALA in 1971 were reacting to and 
acting upon the same new left ideals that had been espoused by leftists in the antiwar 
movement and FPCC. Unlike the liberals who viewed Vietnam as a “mistake,” CALA-
NICH activists understood it as a symptom of the larger problem, the system of 
capitalism and imperialism. New left activists throughout the 1960s had indicted these 
U.S.-perpetuated systems as the inhibitors of freedom in developing nations and as 
hindering true U.S. democracy. The formation of a solidarity group in support of the 
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Cuban revolution with in the U.S. was an influential aspect the new left’s emergence. 
FPCC also created the space to openly critique U.S. policy without the political 
ramifications that U.S. citizens would have faced in the earlier years of the Cold War. 
The FPCC helped set the stage for the anti-imperialists groups in the early years of the 
antiwar movement. SDS was a significant force in the antiwar movement and for the 
continued development of the new left. It helped generate momentum on campuses 
across the country to end the war in Vietnam. SDS also worked to end the systems of 
imperialism and capitalism that were part of a pattern in U.S. foreign policy that had led 
to the war. It is within the framework of the new left activism that centered around 
bringing down these systems that we can gain a better understanding of CALA’s 














Chapter Two: The First Year of CALA 
Madison, Wisconsin’s deep roots in the traditions of progressive and radical 
politics dating back to the 1920s played a large role in shaping CALA.109 During the late 
1950s and 1960s the University and subsequently the city became a center of New Left 
activism. Studies on the Left, Saul Landau and various other students active in FPCC 
were products of the University of Wisconsin. As new left ideals continued to proliferate 
in Madison, the 1960s and early 1970s was marked by several student protests and 
activism against the war in Vietnam. In an article of CALA’s first monthly newsletter, 
published in November 1971, CALA’s language links their new movement to the goals 
and the aims of the radical antiwar activists before them. This new movement was not 
about Vietnam, but it was about exposing U.S. imperialism and ending the U.S. foreign 
empire. As SDS and other radical antiwar activists had espoused earlier the Vietnam war 
was not a mistake and CALA activists understood that an end to capitalism and 
imperialism was the only way to ensure that the devastation of the war would not be 
repeated.  
CALA’s emergence from the antiwar movement to create a solidarity group 
focused on the Latin American struggle was not innovative. The existence of that small 
national network of organizations focused on Latin American solidarity work helped 
influence CALA’s mission. The most notable of these organizations was a North 
American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), which began in 1967 as a forum of 
varying groups and individuals who were “drawn together by 1) our common sense of 
dismay as we perceive the obstructionist role of the United States in Latin America; 2) 
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our common commitment to the necessity of far-reaching social revolution in Latin 
America.”110 While the members of NACLA recognized that the numbers of people 
focused on Latin America were relatively small, the ideals that they were espousing were 
in line with the larger new left movement and the anti-imperialists from the antiwar 
movement. 
NACLA and other groups had set the precedence for a natural coalition between 
anti-imperialists in the antiwar movement and Latin American solidarity work. This 
allowed CALA to step in and carry with it the ideals of the antiwar movement and the 
new left while shifting the conversation to Latin America. CALA’s first newsletter, 
published in November 1971, exemplifies how CALA fused these two elements. The 
article, “The Game of Dominoes in South America,” compared the United States 
government’s reactions to its fears about the spread of communism in Southeast Asia to 
its fears in South America.111 In the 1950s, the U.S. worried that if Vietnam fell to the 
communist “Ho Chi Minh, other non-Communist governments in the area would soon 
topple as well—like so many dominoes.”112 When the article was published in 1971 the 
fear was that leftist governments would soon surround the right-wing military 
dictatorship in Brazil, the U.S. South American ally, with communism. Army officials 
viewed this threat of communism in South American as the “theory of the circle.”113 
These officials argued that Castro’s revolution had been the first threat with Peru, Bolivia 
and Chile following suit soon after. Unless Brazil fought back it would soon be 
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surrounded by hostile communist governments. In 1971 after Allende’s election, Brazil 
began searching for neighboring allies against the Chilean threat but found that 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia had grown closer to Chile and only Paraguay was 
interested in an alliance. Just as the invasion into Vietnam in 1965 had been to stop the 
“dominoes” from falling and CALA argued that if nothing was done to stop U.S. 
influence in Latin America there was a potential for a U.S. supported war between Brazil 
and its leftist neighbors.114 CALA urged U.S. citizens to stand up and “inform our 
representatives that we do not intend to support Brazil’s interference with the right of 
sovereign peoples to decide their own political future.”115 CALA believed that educating 
the community about these U.S. actions could prevent another war in Latin America. Yet 
CALA was not simply focused on preventing another war, it also wanted to end the 
injustices that imperialism created within the U.S. Another article from that same 
newsletter explained that “most of the important foreign and domestic policy decisions 
made in their [the American people’s] name are, in fact, made for the benefit of a few 
rich and powerful individuals…We want to help to give American back to the American 
people. And in so doing, we think we will have helped other peoples to regain their 
freedom and sovereignty.”116Interventions and wars in foreign nations corroded the moral 
fabric of U.S. society and had serious economic consequences for U.S. citizens who lived 
in poverty. CALA initial concentration on the broader issue of imperialism in Latin 
America was meant to address global injustices as well as those that occurred on U.S. 
soil. By February 1972, CALA would start to narrow in on it worries about imperialism 
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in relation to Chile. This growing focus would set the stage for CALA’s second year and 
for the creation of the Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH) in April 1972.   
Why Madison? 
 In order to understand how a small Midwestern city became a center of solidarity 
with Chile, it is necessary to contextualize CALA’s existence within the progressive 
history of Madison, Wisconsin. As universities across the country succumbed to 
Wisconsin Senator Joe McCarthy’s fear mongering in the 1950s, University of Wisconsin 
remained mostly free of McCarthy’s influence.117 Saul Landau recalled how Madison 
became the center of anti-McCarthy politics with leftist activists leading the campaign to 
recall him.118 The firing of professors and the censorship of students and academics at 
other campuses acted as a unifying force between Madison’s Communist and liberal 
communities. These two groups were not natural allies but they saw it as their duty to 
protect the University from an attack on their freedom and free speech. While 
reminiscing about his activity in the Communist Party Landau said, “the liberals saw in 
McCarthyism an infinitely greater threat to their heritage and freedom than could ever be 
constituted by what they must have felt was our naïve, perhaps even reprehensible, faith 
in Stalin and the Soviet Union.”119 While the coalition between liberals and communists 
did not completely stop the McCarthy style attacks on the leftists on campus, Madison 
was “in many ways a haven in a hostile world” and allowed for a safer space for 
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radicalism to grow.120 Although the radical community was not huge in Madison during 
the 1950s, it was given the room to grow during a time where leftist activity was 
predominantly stifled. During this period the leftist students in Madison, who had been 
predominantly raised as communists, were searching for alternatives in activism in light 
of the “exhaustion of the Communist Party USA.”121 These students were more interested 
in topics such as race, which would become the central focus of the new left as opposed 
to the labor issues of the older generations.122The combination of shifting interests and 
the rare space of leftist growth during the McCarthy era allowed the circumstances for a 
generation of leftist to lead the “transition between the Old and the New Left” in 
Madison.123  
 The appointment of Professor William Appleman Williams in 1957 contributed to 
the shift from the Old to New Left in Madison. In a field that had been dominated by the 
Cold War and anti-Stalinist sentiments, Williams brought a fresh approach to the study of 
U.S. society that did not focus on those paradigms.124 Landau, a former communist 
himself, stated that both C. Wright Mills and Williams “had an important influence on 
both the New Left and those who moved from Old to New.”125 Williams along with 
several other scholars at the University forged a new path for academia in the 1960s and 
70s that was focused on a more critical view of U.S. foreign policy, the study of state 
repression and a “bottom up” history that explored under recognized groups such as 
African Americans and the U.S. working class.126 Part of Williams’s criticism of U.S. 
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foreign policy stemmed from his theory of “Corporate Liberalism.” He published an 
article about this theory in Studies on the Left, which he was the faculty advisor of; this 
theory was later incorporated into SDS and some radical antiwar activism to explain the 
system that had created Vietnam.127 Ogelsby, an SDS president in the mid-1960s, later 
expanded on Williams’s idea by arguing that corporate liberals sought to 
‘safeguard…American interests around the world against revolution or revolutionary 
change, which they always called Communism.”128This critique of the corporate state and 
liberals was couched in a general moral criticism of U.S. elites that was part of 
Williams’s and other Wisconsin academics’ radical and new approach to U.S. history. 
Williams’s also argued that while the U.S. appeared to benefit from imperialism, “it was 
a false gain derived from a false view of the self in society” perpetuated by the system of 
liberal capitalism.129 This false view of self was the historical praising of individual 
accomplishment as the marker of the path to a successful society. In fact, Williams saw 
liberalism as a corrosive force on U.S. society and embraced a need to return to the 
socialist vision of “common responsibility.”130 Corporate Liberalism corroded the fabric 
of U.S. values because its blind support for market interests lead to the overthrowing of 
elected governments and the support of racist regimes and human-rights violating 
dictatorships worldwide. For Williams, Ogelsby and many new left activists, corporate 
liberalism was antithetical to the value of democracy. It was a form of elite domination 
that rested on the maintenance of the U.S. empire and exploitation of developing nations. 
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Therefore, criticizing imperialist policies was inherent in the new left’s aims to end the 
elite domination that resulted from corporate liberalism through participatory democracy. 
 Under the influence of scholars like Williams and graduate students like Landau, 
the University of Wisconsin became a campus that cultivated radical activism throughout 
the 1960s and early 1970s. University of Wisconsin was one of the few schools in the 
country that had been able to nurture a leftist culture during the McCarthy era and in turn 
had developed a concentration of “red diaper” babies, children of 1930s leftists. As these 
children grew up and began going to college in the 1960s and 1970s they developed an 
“international consciousness.”131 This meant that leftists on Madison’s campus had a 
heightened sensitivity to the interconnectedness between global and domestic struggles. 
This new left presence and international consciousness was an important factor for 
CALA’s formation and it had created the circumstances for leftist antiwar activism to 
blossom in Madison.  
Due to the radical intellectual culture that had cultivated at the University of 
Wisconsin from the 1950s throughout the 1960s, antiwar activism found a natural home 
in Madison. Yet in August of 1970, four radical Madison antiwar activists set off a bomb 
in the University of Wisconsin’s Sterling Hall. This building was the site of the Army 
Mathematics Research Center (AMRC) and was bombed as a protest of the University’s 
connections with the government and the war in Vietnam. The attack fatally injured a 
young researcher and wounded seven more individuals who had no connection to 
AMRC.132 This event shocked the students, administrators and residents of Madison and 
has often been associated with the loss of antiwar activism momentum at the University 
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of Wisconsin. Paul Ginsberg, the dean of students at the university in 1970, stated in an 
interview “that when you look in retrospect, to the beginning of the end of the antiwar 
movement on this campus, Sterling Hall is certainly that, I think, time.”133 There is no 
consensus that the bombing caused the decline of Madison’s antiwar movement there is a 
strong argument for a correlation between the two. Sarah O’Brien, a law student at the 
time who later worked on the defense team of Karl Armstrong, the ringleader of the 
bombing, cited the Kent State shooting earlier in 1970 and various other violent protests 
and firebombings in Madison as other likely contributors to the decline. Yet she does 
note the “strong reaction to that bombing and I think people were very taken aback by the 
fact that somebody was killed and people were injured.”134 
The bombing and the decline of the antiwar movement in Madison were crucial to 
the development of this new anti-imperialist organization. In report written in 1976 by 
Gedicks, a founder of CALA, he remembered that the bombing and its aftermath created 
“a critical juncture in the Madison antiwar movement.”135 This juncture led to “an 
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of a university-based anti-imperialist 
movement” to ensure that CALA would not face the same fate as the antiwar movement 
in Madison had.136 The early organizers of CALA identified access to university 
resources as a strength because it created the means for pinpointing university generated 
research that benefited military technological advancements and the perpetration of the 
war in Vietnam. These known and exposed connections between the military and the 
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university made it easier to for antiwar activists to mobilize students. Yet for the founders 
of CALA the downside of a university-based anti-imperialist organization was that it 
failed to create a broad coalition of U.S. citizens.137  
Many of these CALA founders had been involved in the anti-war movement but 
their radicalization had been spurred by their experiences in the Peace Corps or other 
time spent in Latin American countries dominated by U.S. imperialism. These 
experiences working with people in those countries made CALA members realize the 
most effective way for them to create change was to do work in the U.S. and not Latin 
America. Educating the U.S. citizens in about the negative ramifications of U.S. 
corporate greed was the number one priority in their campaign to avert another 
Vietnam.138 These conversations about the problems regarding corporate interests and 
U.S. imperialism were already commonplace among the radical students who were 
mobilizing on campus. CALA wanted to correct what they saw as a big failure of the 
antiwar movement in Madison by focusing on the Madison community and bringing a 
political consciousness about imperialism to places where it was mostly absent. In order 
to effect change the message needed to spread broadly throughout Madison and the U.S. 
and not just to the students and academics at the University.  
NACLA 
 The activist discourse in the U.S. during the 1960s was dominated by the antiwar 
in Vietnam movement and the African-American fight for equality. Movements of 
solidarity with Latin America within the U.S. were neither large nor at the forefront of 
U.S. activism but they did exist in smaller numbers. However, Latin American solidarity 
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did not occur in a vacuum; individuals interested in this cause were often involved in the 
Civil Rights Movement and the antiwar movement. An article in NACLA’s first 
published newsletter vaguely outlined the group’s mission. It was explicitly stated that, 
“many people can be indentified with several groups, or with no particular group” and 
that members of both SDS and the prominent civil rights organization, Student Non-
Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), were interested in NACLA and its 
commitment to ending U.S. imperialism in Latin America.139 The loose formation of the 
organization gave people the space to be committed to the ideals that NACLA espoused 
rather than to the politics of any specific group. The article continues by stating that 
NACLA “affords a good opportunity for study, action and dialogue among those of us 
who are committed to the liberation of Latin America from North American 
imperialism.”140 While this mission explicitly refers to Latin America the involvement of 
various leftist activist groups points to its commitment to the general goal of ending 
imperialism and liberating people from oppression around the world. 
 While the presence of SDS, SNCC and other leftist activists linked NACLA to 
anti-imperialist activism of the late 1960s, the material in NACLA’s newsletters provide 
a stronger connection between those movements and the solidarity with Latin American 
anti-imperialists. In a report on NACLA’s February 1967 meeting in New York it 
outlined that NACLA “should work to create a broad-based coalition of groups and 
individuals building a radical foreign policy public, which would pressure for reforms in 
US Latin American policy.”141 This broad-based coalition included Andre Gunder Frank, 
                                                
139 Tyson, NACLA Newsletter: 4.  
140 Ibid. 
141 Fred Goff, “February 11th NACLA Meeting,” NACLA Newsletter 1,2 (March 1967): 1, 
http://search.opinionarchives.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/nacla_Web/DigitalArchive.aspx?p anes=2.  
45  
the professor in Montreal who wrote “The Development of Underdevelopment” and 
many other articles in the socialist magazine Monthly Review.142 NACLA’s newsletter 
was also used to advertise the latest research publication about global underdevelopment 
co-written by former SDS chapter president and new left intellectual, Carl Oglesby.143  
Due to their shared goal to end imperialism, NACLA often published articles 
concerning antiwar activism. In the January 1968 newsletter the first article explored the 
role that universities and research institutions within the U.S. played in aiding 
imperialism, specifically in Vietnam.144 While NACLA remained dedicated to the Latin 
American struggle, the importance of alliances with other leftist causes was essential to 
NACLA’s activism.    
At the afternoon session of the NACLA’s February 1967 meeting, a member 
shared his reflections on his recent trip to North Vietnam where he had run into groups of 
Latin Americans who were there to learn guerilla-fighting techniques. He believed that 
one difficulty of building an effective solidarity movement in the U.S. was the inability 
for U.S. citizens to truly grasp the importance of nationalism and independence for 
people who live under foreign imperialism.145 He was told that as a U.S. citizen, the most 
effective way to support the struggle of individuals on the ground fighting imperialism 
was to “work for change in your own country.”146This idea of a global two-tracked 
movement was present in a lot of radical leftist activism at this time. Revolutionaries in 
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developing countries were fighting for their own liberation from imperialism and corrupt 
governments that were propped up by the U.S. government. The revolutionaries on the 
ground repeatedly told U.S. radicals that they must be part of the internal fight to educate 
the masses within the U.S. and in turn change U.S. foreign policy. This internal fight was 
manifested through the activism of various anti-imperialist groups within the U.S.  
Similar to CALA, NACLA was founded as a general Latin American solidarity 
group that published educational material to expose U.S. citizens to a variety of Latin 
American issues. These materials ranged from theoretical articles on dependency, 
imperialism and Latin American underdevelopment to articles on specific relevant 
struggles and events about the Puerto Rican independence movements and the 
dictatorship in Brazil, which lasted from 1964-1985. Shortly after Allende’s election in 
September 1970, Chile became a large focus of NACLA and other activists interested in 
Latin America. In 1971, NACLA unprecedentedly published two newsletters that solely 
discussed the situation in Chile and several other issues that contained at least one article 
about Chile.147 Yet because NACLA was founded as a coalition “formed by a diverse 
group of individuals and groups,” the articles were meant to be more informative and 
shed light on a variety of opinions regarding ending U.S. imperialism rather than promote 
one definitive form of activism around this issue.148 The structure of NACLA as a 
coalition created space for the hope that “groups with specific interests will ‘spin-off’ and 
form their own groups. Perhaps such groups can and will stay in NACLA also.”149 This is 
exactly what the members of CALA did in 1971; they joined together as a solidarity 
group with their own specific vision of how to end to U.S. imperialism.  
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CALA’s First Year  
In reaction to the advisory conference that was held Cornell University at the 
beginning of the 1971, CALA officially formed that summer in Madison.150 While 
NACLA had established itself as a coalition that allowed room for a variety of anti-
imperialists with different visions of solidarity, CALA formed as an organization with a 
more direct vision of how to end imperialism. And just as NACLA had hoped, CALA 
remained connected to the NACLA network. Part of this more directed vision was the 
decision to make CALA an organization that while based on campus, was meant for the 
community as a whole. This decision came from the interrogation about the successes 
and failure of university based organizing from the antiwar movement in Madison. While 
CALA published newsletters that were disseminated throughout the nation, it was still a 
distinctly Madison-based movement that was meant to inspire anti-imperialism within the 
Wisconsin community by finding connections between local issues and Latin America. In 
a short blurb published by the University of Wisconsin’s Ibero-American Studies 
Program’s newsletter in Fall 1971 CALA wrote, “established on the Madison campus for 
the purpose of helping to educate both University and community people about the 
impact of U.S. policies and involvements on Latin America.”151 CALA differed from 
NACLA because it was not a national forum that linked leftists interested in Latin 
America together. CALA was founding a community-based initiative that would 
facilitate change in both Latin American and Wisconsin. The members of CALA viewed 
strategic education about current events, U.S. influence and more specifically local 
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Wisconsin corporate influence in Latin America as the most effective way to create this 
change.152  
In 1971 CALA’s educational efforts were focused on a film series and the 
production of a monthly research newsletter.153 In the first newsletter, which was 
published in November 1971, there are two articles that highlight the importance of film 
and research in CALA’s work. The first article “Cinema for Liberation,” the author 
describes Latin American and other Third World film as a “revolutionary tool.” He 
argued that films created by the victims of U.S. imperialism broke the societal lens of 
colonialism in which people viewed developing world while simultaneously presenting 
the viewer with the reality of imperialism. These films were brought to Madison by 
CALA in the hopes of awakening the conscience of the community to act upon the anti-
imperialist struggle. During November 1971, CALA brought three different films to 
campus; one delved into dependency in Argentina, one discussed urban poverty and 
Chile and the last film discussed how U.S. citizens were taught to view Cuban culture.154 
Although each of these films depicted different struggles in different Latin American 
cultures, each one was meant to highlight the economic and cultural impact of U.S. 
imperialism. Dependency and urban poverty were directly related to prioritization of U.S. 
corporate interest within U.S. foreign policy and the skewed views of Cubans were a 
direct result of the consequences of Cold War era stigma against communists and 
Castro’s revolution. All three of these films made an accessible connection between the 
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abstracted theories of dependency and imperialism and the lives of real people living in 
Latin America for the individuals living in Madison.  
The second article, “The Idea of Guerilla Research,” was written by Gedicks and 
discussed research as another revolutionary tool in the fight for liberation. Gedicks 
named this tool “guerilla research,” which is used “to investigate the causes of this 
situation [underdevelopment] and to raise critical questions about how the various power 
relationships can be changed so that the process of underdevelopment will not 
continue.”155Unequal power relationships, while amplified in the developing world, 
occured in the U.S. as well. Gedicks drew a parallel between the economic situation of 
people in poverty in Latin America and in the rural and mining areas of Northern 
Wisconsin.  
The founding of CALA had coincided with Allende’s nationalization of Chile’s 
copper industry; a process that had created conflict with the U.S. based Kennecott Copper 
Corporation. In response to the nationalization, Kennecott proposed the opening of mines 
in the economically deprived areas of Northern Wisconsin.156 Gedicks explained that 
while “each area experienced tremendous growth due to its rich natural resources 
(copper, iron ore, lumber) but that wealth has not created thriving industrial communities; 
rather, it has resulted in widespread poverty and depression.”157 In 1973 Gedicks 
published a report about Kennecott’s effect in Chile and Rusk County, WI that was a 
culmination of his two years of research as the CALA research coordinator. The report, 
“Kennecott Copper Corporation and Mining Development,” found that characteristics of 
Rusk County’s economy closely resembled economies of developing nations. These 
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economies were typically agricultural, poorly industrialized, had low income and 
employment rates and high rates of outward migration.158 By comparing the exploitation 
of the poor in Latin America to the poor in rural Wisconsin CALA was interested in 
making issues of dependency urgent for the Madison community. CALA was trying to 
show people that exploitation did not just happen across the world, it was happening in 
their own backyard. This was part of the international consciousness, the understanding 
that global liberation is linked; my freedom is your freedom. 
While CALA’s main focus was on organizing the Madison community, its also 
attempted to engaged and educate Wisconsin’s rural working class about its findings on 
the copper industry in Rusk County. Gedicks argued that for people to understand and 
take action against imperialism it must relate to their immediate economic situations.159 
Yet the only evidence of CALA’s work in Northern Wisconsin was Gedicks’ mention of 
five activists in Green Bay who were working with CALA to disseminate information 
about Kennecott and a few interactions with farmers in the affected regions.160 The 
connection between Madison and the individuals in the mining regions remained mostly 
academic. CALA used the research to organized against Kennecott, but it had little 
overlap or interaction with the individuals who were affected firsthand by the 
exploitation.  
Even within the Madison community it is unclear how much interaction CALA 
had with individuals who were not affiliated with the University. The advisory board of 
                                                
158 Al Gedicks, “Kennecott Copper Corporation and Mining Development,” 1973, Folder Multinationals, 
Box 2, Community Action on Latin America Records Part 4: Additions, 1974-1982, Wisconsin Historical 
Society, 34.  
159 Gedicks, “The Idea of Guerilla Research,” 5. 
160 Al Gedicks, “Politics of Copper,” Workforce, (May-June 1973), Folder 4, Box 5, Community Action on 
Latin America Records Part 5: Additions, 1971-1999, Wisconsin Historical Society, 24.  
51  
CALA was made up of University of Wisconsin faculty members, students from both the 
U.S. and Latin America, and religious campus leaders. In a CALA advertisement through 
the Ibero-American Studies department, inquiries about CALA were directed to the 
campus Episcopal chaplain, Reverend Arthur Lloyd and Professors David Chaplin and 
Alex Wilde. In fact, Professor David Chaplin was also on the executive committee for the 
University of Wisconsin’s Ibero-American Studies program.161 A later addition to the 
CALA team, the film series coordinator, Tom Sinks had received a M.A. in Public Policy 
from University of Wisconsin.162 In the CALA archive at the Wisconsin Historical 
Institute, the majority of the correspondences outside of Madison are between CALA 
staffers such as Sinks, Gedicks and Bruce Vandervort, the program coordinator and other 
CALA staff member, and academics at other universities. These letters show that CALA 
was well connected not just to the University of Wisconsin, but also to the larger 
academic world.  
Yet CALA was not solely influential at the University. By the beginning of 1972 
the organization had become better known in the Madison area. Citing more recognition 
in Madison as well as invitations to speak on campus and for other groups around the 
city, CALA announced a formation of a speakers bureau in its March 1972 newsletter.163 
Although CALA was expanding and gaining recognition in Madison it is difficult to 
gauge the scope of its engagement with the non-University community. Yet it is clear that 
outside of the academic world, CALA most effectively engaged the church community. 
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In an update about CALA’s second semester, Vandervort wrote that its newsletters were 
sent to about 1,200 churches throughout the state of Wisconsin including 43 local ones.164 
CALA’s interaction with the Church community had existed from its inception when the 
United Ministries of Higher Education (UMHE) and the United Presbyterian Church 
proposed the idea of regional centers of Latin American research. Yet CALA continued 
to grow outside of the campus-affiliated church community and the Presbyterian Church. 
Letters from Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist and Congregational Churches from across the 
nation were sent to CALA. These clergymen were looking for resources and educational 
materials on Latin America, which they could share with their congregants.165 
 CALA’s engagement with the Church community highlights a trend of radical 
Christian activism in the U.S that was sympathetic to the goals of CALA and other anti-
imperialist organizations that had emerged in the 1960s. “The inequities of American 
society exposed by the civil rights movement prompted the religious community to 
reevaluate its cold war attitudes.”166The legal discrimination against blacks in the U.S. 
coupled with the violence that was used to enforce the discrimination forced members of 
the religious community to be vocal and oppose the immorality that they witnessed. The 
multi-denominational religious activism from the civil rights movement served as a 
catalyst for clergy to join the antiwar movement and work together as a religious 
community opposed to injustices.167Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam 
(CALCAV), was the prominent group that organized one of the largest constituencies of 
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antiwar movement, the religious community. Many members of CALCAV were 
concerned not just with the war but also with other injustices including U.S. foreign 
policies, racism and disproportional corporate influence.168This trend of ecumenical 
activism against injustices perpetuated by the U.S. from the 1960s continued into the 
1970s and provides an explanation about the large church and campus ministry 
involvement in CALA.  
As CALA continued to grow during its first year, the focus of the organization 
began to shift. CALA’s initial focus as a general Latin American solidarity organization 
provided room to explore multiple significant topics in the region. Among these topics 
were the military dictatorship in Brazil, the nationalization of Chilean copper, and 
critiques of U.S. corporate involvement in Latin America and Nixon’s foreign policy. 
The first four CALA newsletters were titled: The Game of Dominos in Latin America, 
Indochina in Latin America, Latin America: Nixon’s Game Plan, and Missionaries for the 
Empire in Latin America.169 These newsletters were published from November 1971 to 
March 1972 and both the titles and the content reflected CALA’s holistic approach to 
Latin American issues. Compared to the CALA newsletters that were published after 
April 1972, these earlier editions did not focus strictly on Chile. Yet by the February 
1972 edition, Chile had begun to receive considerably more attention in CALA’s 
publications. In the November 1971 newsletter there was an article on the responses of 
Kennecott and Anaconda, two U.S. copper corporations to their nationalization in Chile, 
one on Uruguayan and Bolivian elections and the articles on guerilla research and 
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revolutionary cinema.170 And the December 1971 newsletters contained an article on U.S. 
support for the dictatorship in Brazil, on Chilean Poet Pablo Neruda’s Noble prize and a 
poem he wrote comparing Anaconda in Chile, to a serpent.171 As there was no January 
1972 newsletter, the February issue featured on article the media’s depiction of Allende’s 
government and on Nixon’s support for Brazil and his undermining of Chile. There was 
also an article that reinforced CALA’s appeal to ending U.S. imperialism and an 
advertisement for a recent NACLA publication, “New Chile.”172 The growing focus on 
Chile was due in part to the upcoming CALA conference on Chile but it was also due to a 
growing concern within the anti-imperialist community about the Nixon Administrations 
actions towards the Allende government. 
The content of NACLA’s newsletters in the early 1970s shows a similar shift in 
focus towards Chile. From 1967-1971, the Brazilian dictatorship and Puerto Rican 
independence movements were the most common topics in NACLA articles. Yet in 1971, 
NACLA published two different newsletters, dedicated solely to articles about Chile and 
Allende’s government.173 These were the first two issues that NACLA had dedicated to 
one specific country. The March “Special Issue: Chile,” focused on Allende’s election, 
the UP’s platform, U.S. investments in Chile, and the response of a more left wing party, 
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria’s (MIR),  to the UP’s platform. The end of the 
newsletter includes an interview with Allende conducted by Landau.174 The September 
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issue, “In Chile…There Will Be Work For All,” was an in-depth investigation of the 
nationalization of Chilean copper and U.S. copper corporation’s activities in Chile.175 By 
1972, Chile was featured in almost every NACLA newsletter published that year. In the 
February issue an article explained that Brazil and Chile are the two countries “which 
concern U.S. imperialist strategists today…Chile presents a different situation for 
imperialism as its leftist coalition government under Salvador Allende struggles to halt 
U.S. penetration of the economy.”176 The Nixon administration’s animosity towards the 
Allende government coupled with the nationalization of Chilean copper in the summer of 
1971 contributed to the increasing focus on Chile amongst Latin American-focused U.S. 
anti-imperialists in 1972. Although Nixon was not a liberal, Williams’s theory of 
corporate liberalism provides a framework to understand the collusion between corporate 
and government interests against Allende’s leftist government in Chile. As Chile was 
becoming the target of Nixon’s foreign policy it was also becoming the focus of Latin 
American anti-imperialists within the U.S. 
 Madison’s history as a haven for leftists during the 1950s and as a key new left 
center provided a space for antiwar and subsequently anti-imperialist activism to thrive. 
With the decline of the antiwar movement in the 1970s coupled with the influential work 
of NACLA, CALA was able to create an anti-imperialist organization that had a direct 
vision of how to end U.S. domination in Latin America. Through film series, newsletters, 
research on local underdevelopment and a speakers bureau CALA set out to educate U.S. 
citizens, specifically the Madison community, about the dangers of imperialism. As 1972 
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went on, CALA began concentrating on Chile and its conference on Chile held in April 
1972 served as a turning point for the organization. While the first year of CALA was 
focused on educating the greater Madison and Wisconsin community about anti-
imperialism, the next year and a half of CALA would focus on the dangers of a U.S. 







































Chapter Three: The Imminent Danger of Intervention 
 
  The sweeping reforms of Allende’s government were a source of inspiration to 
liberation movements in nations across the developing world. Allende’s political 
project,“la vía chilena al socilaismo”(the Chilean way to Socialism), involved agrarian 
reforms and nationalization of the copper industry as a means of returning power and 
wealth to the working and rural classes in Chile. This revolution provided other 
liberations movements the hope that governments, which represented the people and not 
the interests of the elite classes and global superpowers, could exist. Yet while Allende’s 
popularity was growing amongst people in developing nations who wanted an end to U.S. 
intervention and a fundamental change in U.S.-dominated global economics, the Nixon 
administration’s efforts towards dismantling the Chilean government grew stronger.177 
The Nixon administration’s policy of détente that had been employed in the early 1970s 
toward Russia and China did not extend to the U.S.-Chilean relationship during Allende’s 
regime. Historian Tanya Harmer argued, “it was in 1972--the very year that Nixon visited 
Moscow and Beijing--that the Chileans came to…acknowledge that détente actually 
closed doors instead of opening them.”178Economic struggles in the Soviet Union 
informed its decision embrace détente with the U.S. even when the U.S. made it clear that 
these policies would not extend to Cuba and Chile. The primary concern of the Soviet 
Union was to ensure the stability of its economy, which would be most fruitful by 
embracing détente, rather than supporting the Chilean and Cuban governments. The UP’s 
economic situation was deteriorating and without support of the Soviet Union there was 
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little hope for an economic recovery in Chile. While many viewed détente as a notable 
step towards ending the Cold War, the U.S. decision to only engaged in détente with two 
superpowers and not Chile and Cuba showed that Nixon was more focused on expanding 
economic opportunities than attempting to end the ideological tensions of the war.179  
As relations between the U.S., the Soviet Union and China were beginning to 
warm; the U.S. government was continuing covert actions in Chile to undermine the 
Allende government. This led CALA and NACLA to become increasingly focused on 
Chile and more specifically, the dangers of U.S. interventions in Chile in 1972. The shift 
of focus after CALA’s first year was responsive to the larger trend within the U.S. 
government of more frequent U.S. attempts to help overthrow Allende in 1972-1973.  
 The “Madison Conference on Chile” that CALA hosted in April 1972 marked 
this major shift in CALA’s concentration and approach to its solidarity work. During the 
first nine months of CALA’s existence it had increasingly published articles about Chile. 
By the time of the conference there was a feeling that CALA needed to do more to 
prevent the growing possibility of a U.S. intervention in Chile. It was these sentiments 
that spurred the creation of Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH), a group that operated as a 
“sub-project” of CALA, at the April Conference.180 Whereas CALA was created as a 
general Latin America-focused anti-imperialist collective that worked within the Madison 
community, NICH was a national anti-imperialist organization dedicated to building a 
solidarity movement to stop a U.S. intervention in Chile. Similar to CALA, NICH aimed 
to achieve its goals by educating U.S. citizens about the situation in Chile but it also 
focused on taking direct action against corporations involved in subverting Allende’s 
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power. This conference can be identifed as the moment that CALA began organizing 
against intervention in Chile in addition its goal of addressing anti-imperialist concerns in 
all of Latin America.  
 From April 1972 until the military coup on September 11, 1973, CALA-NICH’s 
activism was direct action and research based. During this time CALA remained centered 
in Madison and devoted time to educating the community and researching U.S. corporate 
ties between Chile and the United States. Yet the specificity and urgency of NICH’s 
mission created the conditions for it to become a national movement with reach outside 
of Wisconsin. The Bay Area became another center of NICH activism outside of 
Madison and NACLA staff members led it. The coalition between the U.S. government, 
corporations and the right wing parties in Chile led to attempted coups, political 
polarization, and an increased premonition that danger laid ahead for Chile. This 
increased sense of urgency helped create more momentum for NICH’s cause. While 
CALA-NICH could not have anticipated the fatal end of Allende, it sensed that more 
needed to be done to support him and end U.S. involvement in Chile. This feeling of 
imminent danger and fear occupied CALA-NICH from the conference in April 1972 until 
September 1973.  
Madison Conference on Chile 
  In partnership with the University of Wisconsin’s Ibero-American Studies 
Program, CALA sponsored the Madison Conference on Chile on April 13-15, 1972 at the 
University Catholic Center.181 This was the first national conference CALA hosted and 
according to promotional material sent out a week before the conference its aim was “to 
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promote interest in and knowledge about recent developments in Chile by bringing 
together Latin and North American scholars and members of the greater Madison and 
University communities.”182 The goal that CALA articulated for its conference fits within 
the framework of its first-year activism as it was meant to be an educational event for the 
community yet was mostly centered within the academic community. Most 
correspondences about the conference were between CALA members and professors 
from across North America. CALA kept a list of people it contacted to speak at the 
conference that included about twenty-seven professors from History, Political Science, 
Latin American Studies and Sociology departments from various universities.183 Many of 
the contacted professors were radicals such as Miles Wolpin, a Political Science 
Professor at St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia. Wolpin wrote that he was 
interested in the conference but requested funds because of his “extremely tenuous status 
here (my chairman has not spoken to me for the past ten months),” due to his radical 
political views.184 He added that he could not ask for money from his department because 
his “contract is up for renewal or termination next month,” and the situation was 
extremely delicate, as he had “already been denied jobs at two and probably three other 
institutions solely because of my radical perspective.”185 Several other professors 
requested funds from CALA in order to participate in the conference and the University 
of Wisconsin footed the $1,270 bill to help bring these professors out to Madison.   
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 These professors, along with many others, all participated the panels that 
dominated the structure of the three-day conference. On the first day, Thursday, April 13, 
Orlando Letelier, the Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. gave the keynote address. The 
second day consisted of a panels on the Chilean Political Economy, Chile in the 
International Context and a reading of Chilean poet Pablo Neruda’s work by the Chilean 
Cultural Attaché to the U.S., Fernando Alegria, and a screening of two films, “Chile Puts 
on Long Pants” and “How and Why the General Was Murdered.” The latter film was 
about General René Schneider’s murder in 1970 and the role it played in Allende’s 
election. The final day of the conference featured panels on Mass Political Participation 
and the Problems Facing Chile in the Immediate Future. The conference concluded with a 
concert by Argentinean folk singer Suni Paz, a visiting professor at Rutgers University 
and part of nueva canción, a Latin American folk music movement that was committed to 
revolutionary ideology and political activism.186  In her correspondence with CALA she 
wrote that her “songs reflect the goals of Unidad Popular.” Through her music she hoped 
“to give an accurate picture of 1) Chile’s need for socialism 2) their present road towards 
socialism, and 3) Unidad Popular’s goals.”187 Her participation in other conferences on 
third world and Latin American anti-imperialist movements also informed her decision to 
join CALA’s conference.188  
 The idea of presenting an in-depth conference on Chile had been on CALA’s 
agenda since the end of 1971 and it was organized to address “problems and prospects of 
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the Allende regime.”189 More broadly, Chile was chosen to exemplify the trend of U.S. 
propagated misinformation on Latin American revolutions. CALA’s February 1972 
newsletter, “Latin America: Nixon’s Game Plan,” reiterated why CALA cared about 
educating U.S. citizens. “The media tells us that Latin America is poor and beset by 
dictators, but never explains why. T.V. documentarians show that Spanish-speaking 
Americans are up in arms, but the reasons are not spelled out. It seems clear that we must 
have more and better sources of information on these questions if we are ever to go 
forward.”190There was little transparency in the U.S. media about the government’s 
actions in Latin America, which had propped up dictatorships in pre-Castro Cuba and in 
contemporary Brazil while branding revolutions that stood up to U.S. imperialism, such 
as Chile, as backward and dangerous. The growth of economic nationalism throughout 
the developing world was a threat to the U.S. empire because more nations were seeking 
domestic control over their own economies and not blindly prioritizing U.S. interests. 
CALA organized the conference in order to present a picture of the Allende government 
that could not be found in the mainstream media.  
In the February newsletter there was an article that compared New York Times 
coverage of a Chilean protest to the French newspaper Le Monde’s coverage of a 
women’s hunger march in Santiago. These two publications were chosen because they 
were both influential, liberal and had staff members working in Santiago. The CALA 
article highlighted the difference between the U.S. media and the foreign media’s 
reporting of the march. The women planned this event to protest Allende’s order of 
martial law in Santiago in preparation for Castro’s visit to the city. While the New York 
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Times was quick to blame Allende for overreacting, Le Monde told a different story. It 
reported that the protest was led by upper class women who used the issue of hunger as a 
façade for their true aim of creating a political opportunity to embarrass Allende during 
Castro’s visit. “It seems to be an attempt to heighten political tension in Chile and to 
provoke the kind of violent confrontation that Allende-knowing the U.S. tendency for 
equating Left-wing government (even when legally established, as in the Chilean case) 
with mob rule- has been scrupulously avoiding.”191 The oversimplification and in some 
cases the blatantly negative coverage of Allende’s government worried CALA members 
who saw the conference as a needed opportunity for fully informed dialogue on Chile’s 
present and future situation.192  
In order to counter the misinformation and oversimplification surrounding Chile, 
CALA structured the panels to discuss an array of topics.  In the Mass Political 
Participation panel, Elsa Chaney, a professor at Fordham University, discussed the 
political role of women in Chile while California State College Professor, Donald Bray, 
discussed mass mobilization of individuals in the Chilean political system.193 Most of the 
panelists were presenting their own published papers or dissertations and other topics 
included past Chilean elections, historical perspectives on the UP government and the 
effects of foreign investments on Chilean politics.194 The panelists all reinforced CALA’s 
mission of providing in-depth understanding of Allende’s presidency in the context of 
Chilean history and U.S. foreign relations. Only two panel speakers were not professors 
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or graduate students, they were Berkeley based NACLA staff members, Elizabeth 
Farnsworth and Susanne Bodenheimer. Both of whom had contributed to NACLA’s one-
hundred and sixty page reader on Unidad Popular’s first year in power.195  
Not only were all the panelists experts on the present situation in Chile and the 
country’s history, many of them were products of the same ideological environment that 
spawned CALA. Of the twelve professors who spoke, four of them had direct 
connections to the University of Wisconsin. Donald Bray and Harvard graduate student, 
Andrew Zimbalist, both attended the University as undergraduates, and Bray cited his 
interactions with Professor William Appleman Williams as influential for his intellectual 
growth.196 Charney received her PhD from the University of Wisconsin and Claudio 
Barriga, who spoke on “The End of Latifundium and the Role of the Peasantry,” was in 
the last year of his PhD at the University.  
In a conference advertisement that CALA placed in the University of Wisconsin’s 
Ibero-American newsletter it stated, “we want the conference to be a public event, 
bringing together knowledgeable academics and community and campus people who 
want to know more about the first Latin American nation to elect a Marxist president. 
This, we think, is in keeping with the purposes of CALA.”197As there is no available list 
of attendees at the conference there is no way to gauge if this event attracted any non-
University affiliated community members. But outside of academics, NACLA staff and 
Chilean embassy staff, news of the conference appeared to reach various local and 
national church groups. John Sinclair, the regional secretary for Latin America at United 
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Presbyterian Church in the United States’ Commission on Ecumenical Mission and 
Relations, responded to CALA about his excitement for the conference. He published an 
announcement about the conference in Monday Morning, a journal that went out to 
Presbyterian pastors nationwide.198Sinclair followed up after the conference and 
requested 100 copies of pamphlets from the conference to distribute to his constituents. 
Word of the conference reached campus chaplains and pulpit clergy from different 
denominations and parts of the country.199  
 This conference exemplified CALA’s model of education as political activism; it 
used the current situation in Chile and people’s confusion about it to push forward its 
anti-imperialist agenda. While there was an attempt to bring in speakers who were not 
leftists, most of speakers, like Paz, espoused messages of anti-imperialism and implicit 
and explicit support for Allende. When Fredrick Pike, a history professor at University of 
Notre Dame who had written extensively on Chilean politics, was invited to the 
conference he declined because he felt that he would be ideologically out of place.200 
Pike’s fears were not unfounded, as an in-depth look at the panels shows a general 
critique of U.S. government and corporate interactions with the Allende government. The 
Chilean Political Economy Panel featured professors who had written and were 
presenting on “Foreign Investments and Chilean Politics,” “Counter Revolutionary 
Forces” and how they impacted the Allende government and Chilean economic 
climate.201 Paul Sigmund, a Professor of Politics at Princeton, wrote that while it would 
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be interesting to try to get some right-wing and Christian Democrats to come to the event 
he noted the tension in creating a more diverse space because many of them identify as 
political refugees who had escaped the Allende government and therefore would not 
speak to anyone from the embassy.202 Fernando Alegria, the Chilean Cultural Attaché to 
the U.S., and Letelier’s participation in the conference indicates an acceptance and 
celebration of the validity of the Chilean government. This conference was not intended 
to create an educational space with a diversity of ideas about the situation in Chile; it was 
meant to lift up the Allende government and inform people about the situation in Chile in 
a way that the media and the government were not.  
 Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH) emerged as an unexpected consequence of the 
April Conference on Chile. As the imminent threat of a U.S. intervention in Chile became 
more visible, the majority of the conference participants decided that there needed to be a 
more urgent and organized approach to ensuring that the Allende government was not 
overthrown. CALA was elected to “serve as the national coordinating agency” for NICH.  
Although NICH was a national committee it was predominantly based and coordinated in 
Madison.203 At the conference NICH gathered a list of about eighty-six people who 
identified themselves as part of this new Chile solidarity committee. This list was not 
limited to Latin America-focused anti-imperialists and included Dianne Roland, a 
member of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee.204 Additionally, both NACLA staff 
members, Bodenheimer and Farnsworth, became two of the leaders of the NICH-
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Berkeley chapter, which would soon become the strongest chapter. A few days after the 
conference ended, Farnsworth sent a note to CALA expressing her excitement about 
NICH and how it will pave the road for future Chile support groups to “proliferate 
throughout the country.”205 By the end of June 1972, NICH-Berkeley under Farnsworth’s 
leadership had held its first meeting, which attracted ten individuals, five of whom were 
Chilean.206 
 The birth of NICH was a turning point for CALA, both in its approach to activism 
and in its ability to mobilize anti-imperialists in the U.S. While CALA remained 
committed to its original mission of guerilla research and community engagement in 
relation to Latin America as a whole; the next year and a half of the organization cannot 
be separated from NICH and its new focus on Chile. I will refer to the post-April 1972 
organization as CALA-NICH, except in cases where I am able to distinguish between the 
two, in which case I will refer to CALA or NICH separately. With its explicit focus on 
Chile, CALA-NICH made direct action a central element of its program. It was this 
mixture of corporate research and direct action that marked the post-conference period of 
CALA-NICH’s existence.  
The Tactical Shift in Activism  
 One of the first direct actions that CALA-NICH organized was a boycott 
campaign against the telephone corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (ITT), which began in July 1972. In conjunction with the U.S. government and 
other corporations, ITT had played a role in raising over one million dollars to defeat 
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Allende in the 1964 presidential campaign. Then in 1970, ITT attempted to give one 
million more dollars to ensure that Congress would not confirm Allende as president.207 
CALA members had known this information when journalist Jack Anderson leaked 
secret memos from the corporation in March 1972, which further “reveal[ed] ITT’s 
crucial role in creating economic chaos and undermining Allende’s democratically 
elected government.”208ITT’s motivation to overthrow Allende came from its investments 
in the Chitelco, the national Chilean phone system and some manufacturing plants, which 
were worth more than $200 million dollars. After ITT, the CIA, the Nixon 
Administration and the right wing Chilean parties’ attempted coup failed in October 1970 
and after the Chilean government expropriated the phone system in late 1971, ITT’s vice 
president sent Nixon’s Advisor for Economic Affairs a proposal for a new strategy to 
address the Chile problem.209 He presented “a 18-point program for bringing about an 
economic crisis which would destroy Allende’s government. The plan included creation 
of a special White House task force which would be assisted by the CIA in extensive 
economic warfare, subversion of the Chilean armed forces and diplomatic sabotage.”210  
 In the aftermath of the ITT discovery, CALA-NICH focused its April, May and 
October 1972 newsletters on the scandal. The April newsletter, “Subversion in Chile: 
U.S. Style,” was written directly after Anderson’s exposition of the ITT memos. It largely 
focused on ITT’s role in the attempted 1970 coup and its collusion with the U.S. 
government to create economic chaos in Chile. With nearly two months to synthesize the 
information, the May issue, “Chile After ITT and the CIA,” focused on the implications 
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of ITT’s actions. Gedicks argued that the most significant implication was “that many of 
the measures ITT had been proposing were already part of U.S. policy towards Chile and 
continue to be carried out at various levels of U.S. policy-making.”211The newsletter 
expanded on the Nixon administration’s policy of overt and covert economic intervention 
and its continued monetary and social relationship with the Chilean military. In the 
article, “A Call for Opposition To U.S. Intervention in Chile,” CALA-NICH directly link 
anti-imperialist activism in Vietnam to the situation in Chile by explaining that these are 
just two of the many examples where their “right to self-determination is regarded in 
Washington as jeopardizing the interests of the United States.”212As intervention attempts 
by the U.S. against Chile were becoming better known, the connection between the 
Vietnam and Chile became stronger. While there was no war in Chile, the public nature 
of the ITT scandal made the role the U.S. played in subverting its self-determination 
harder to ignore. At the end of the article NICH directly called upon “those who have 
already demonstrated their opposition to the Southeast Asia War to join in declaration of 
support,” for NICH’s efforts against intervention in Chile.213 This call to action was the 
first stage of CALA-NICH’s mobilization efforts around the ITT scandal. The next stage 
came in June at the North American Anti-Imperialist Coalition Conference (NAAIC) in 
July 1972.  
 NAAIC was a national coalition of about twenty-two anti-imperialist groups in 
the U.S. that were all focused on different global liberation struggles. CALA-NICH was a 
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member group of NAAIC along with another Madison based anti-imperialist group, 
Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa (MACSA).214NAAIC identifed anti-
imperialism as a class struggle and one of its main tenants was a dedication to campaigns 
against corporations, governments and military groups that oppressed the working and 
lower classes.215 At the 1972 NAAIC conference in Allenspark, CO, CALA proposed a 
boycott of ITT to be adopted by all the NAAIC member groups. In the proposal, CALA-
NCIH explained that the widespread exposure of this scandal made ITT an important 
national target. Yet the most important message was that groups focused on Southeast 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East were all impacted by ITT’s intervention in Chile. Not 
only was ITT’s enterprise present in all of those regions but also because anti-corporate 
activism was anti-imperialist activism.216 If this happened in Chile, it could happen 
anywhere therefore, in light of the scandal’s exposure there needed to be a strong reaction 
against ITT.  
The proposal was voted on and passed, which committed all NAAIC groups to 
join the already existing boycott against the ITT subsidiary, Wonder Bread. This boycott 
had been organized by antiwar groups including Vietnam Peace Parade Committee and 
Women’s Strike for Peace in 1972 as a reaction to ITT’s role as one of the top defense 
contractors for the U.S. in Vietnam. The proposal of consumer boycott against Wonder 
Bread was an accessible way to call on U.S. citizens to speak up against the war effort 
since consumers did not have the power to boycott military weaponry sales. Consumer 
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boycotts and anti-corporate activism would become a trademark of 1970s activism as a 
way for U.S. citizens to attempt to put pressure on corporations that perpetrated economic 
and imperialist injustices across the world. Usually these boycott did not significantly 
impact the corporations’ financial situation but in many instances they were able to put 
public pressure on these corporations to correct their immoral actions.  
 Through coalition building CALA-NICH called the other anti-imperialist groups 
to join against ITT’s actions in Vietnam and in Chile. It also called for member groups to 
disseminate information about ITT in their publications and geographical areas, to 
investigate church and universities investments in ITT and to provide input to antiwar 
groups about “the connection between ITT as a war contractor as well as a multinational 
conglomeration in service of the interests of empire.”217 While a large part of this boycott 
campaign was education-based, this was CALA-NICH’s first direct action campaign. 
CALA-NICH capitalized on the urgency to spread the word about ITT’s activities in 
Chile by engaging other groups with the anti-corporate activism as anti-imperialism 
activism framework.  
CALA-NICH’s own anti-imperialist activism was spurred by an attempt to 
prevent another Vietnam in Latin America and for this campaign it employed the same 
logic. ITT’s unchecked actions had been a threat in Vietnam and now in Chile and until 
anti-imperialist groups worked together to end corporate oppression of the working and 
lower classes around the world more “ITT interventions were inevitable.” Until the 
systems of oppression ended the need for solidarity groups would be relentless. 
Therefore, anti-imperialist groups needed to work together to ensure an end to corporate 
and governmental economic oppression. This task would be accomplished by the masses 
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and not by the elite that benefited from these systems. In this vein consumer boycotts and 
grassroots campaigns were effective means to pressure corporations and government’s 
actions.  
Solidarity and coalition building with other activist movements was necessary in 
order to increase the visibility and effectiveness of any CALA-NICH direct action. The 
ITT boycott campaign demonstrated how CALA-NICH made an issue that was central to 
Chile important to all anti-imperialist groups. This campaign also exposed the inherent 
connection between anti-corporate and anti-imperialist activity. Intersectionality between 
activism was key to building solidarity and in turn strengthening movements. In letter to 
the editor of the New York Times, CALA-NICH did not simply critique the coverage of 
the Allende government but they also call out the reporter’s racism and sexism.218 
CALA-NICH and other leftist activists were in tune with the role that racism and sexism 
played in liberation movements throughout the world as well as in the U.S. By being 
aware of this connection, coalition building was opened not just to other anti-imperialist 
groups but also to feminist, racial equality and workers rights movements. While it is 
unclear if CALA-NICH was successful in building coalitions with these movements, it is 
clear that it was attuned to the concerns of these movements.  
A NICH organized demonstration in support of Allende was an instance in which 
a diversity of supporters outside of CALA-NICH came to protest. When Allende came to 
speak at the United Nations headquarters in New York on December 4, 1972, NICH 
organized a demonstration outside the Kennecott Copper headquarters against U.S. policy 
in Chile. The Communist party, the Young Workers Liberation League, Youth Against 
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War and Fascism, NAAIC, and other local groups joined NICH in this demonstration, 
which brought 250 people to the streets of New York in support of Allende.219 Half of the 
crowd was made up of Latino and black activists and everyone was carrying signs calling 
for “U.S. Imperialism Hands Off Chile,” and chanting for an “end to the invisible 
blockade.”220 While there is mention of NICH activity in New York in the archive, it was 
not a strong center for the committee. The ability of NICH to bring out 250 activists from 
various organizations to this demonstration shows some power of CALA-NICH’s 
coalition building skills.  
 CALA-NICH continued to expand its activism outside of Madison by organizing 
direct actions through its newsletter that reached audiences across the nation. In the 
November 1972 newsletter, “Kennecott vs. Chilean Self-Determination,” there was an in-
depth report on Kennecott’s efforts to block the sales of Chilean copper as a response to 
the Allende government’s expropriation of copper. Kennecott had sent letters to Chilean 
copper consumers warning of its power to embargo up to 49% of copper purchases. In 
October, a Kennecott subsidiary in Paris had won an initial court verdict to deny 
payments to the Chilean government for any copper it receives. In response to the verdict, 
French dockworkers refused to unload any Chilean copper in solidarity with the Chilean 
government. The ship was then rerouted to the Netherlands where the Dutch dockworkers 
also refused to unload it in solidarity with the Chilean government’s right to self-
determination and the Chilean workers whose wages would be suspend without payment 
for the shipment. In the back of the newsletter was a letter “to the French and Dutch 
dockworkers who refused to unload copper in solidarity with Chile” and a petition to Mr. 
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Frank Milliken, the president of Kennecott Copper Corporation for people to gather 
signatures on and send back to Madison.  
While Kennecott was filing lawsuits in Europe other U.S. corporations were 
refusing to supply Chile with technological items that Chile was dependent on causing 
shortages in the Chilean economy.221 “The timing of these actions…suggest a well 
orchestrated strategy on the part of U.S. governmental-corporate decision makers to 
provoke a major economic crisis in Chile,” which would weaken Allende and strengthen 
his opposition.222 The petition to the Kennecott Copper Corporation president that 
expressed outrage at its actions and to condemn its actions as “an act of international 
piracy.”223 Recipients of the newsletter were encouraged to tear our and then circulate the 
petition and then send it back to NICH. The NICH archive documents twenty-two pages 
of the petition that total to about two hundred and sixteen signatures that NICH then sent 
to the Kennecott president.224 Despite CALA-NICH’s continued efforts to force 
Kennecott’s hand through research on the politics of the copper industry and through 
petitions such as this one, the efforts had little impact on Kennecott’s operations. While 
CALA-NICH may not have changed much in terms of Kennecott’s actions, Gedicks 
reported that the major players in the corporation were aware of CALA-NICH and the 
work that they were doing in regards to anti-corporate, anti-imperialist activism.225   
Although the creation of NICH and the newfound sense of urgency around the 
situation in Chile created more opportunities for a direct action strategy, education- based 
                                                
221 “Kennecott vs. Chilean Self-Determination,” CALA Newsletter, (November 1972), Folder 10, Box 2, 
M94-371, Community Action on Latin America Part 5: Additions, 1971-1999, Wisconsin Historical 
Society, 1.   
222 Ibid, 4.  
223 Ibid, 5. 
224 Petitions to Frank Milliken, Folder 9, Box 1, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin America 
Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
225 Al Gedicks, Interview with Al Gedicks. Phone. Fairfax, VA, 6/19/15.  
75  
activism remained essential to the organization’s mission. The national reach and 
specificity in topic of NICH allowed for the circumstances to pass around petitions, 
organize demonstrations and stage boycotts, but there was still a need to educate U.S. 
citizens about Chile and other Latin American causes. The CALA model of education 
was used to facilitate the direct actions that NICH organized. The petitions were sent out 
in the CALA newsletters and the research that Gedicks and other members were 
conducting was used to highlight the connections between anti-imperialism and ITT and 
Kennecott’s roles in threatening stability in Chile and other parts of the developing world. 
Without CALA’s emphasis on education and radical research, it would have been more 
difficult to mobilize individuals in support of NICH’s direct actions.  
CALA used education to facilitate direct action in support of Allende’s Chile but 
it also continued with its education on various countries in Latin America, anti-
imperialism and the interconnectedness between Latin American workers and Wisconsin 
workers after the conference. In the fall of 1972, CALA added a Latin American 
Speaker’s Bureau in addition to its semester film series. The suggested topics for the 
bureau were based on the availability of speakers and included many topics ranging from 
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America, Latin American literature, women and social 
change and alternative models of economic development with a focus on Brazil, Chile 
Cuba, Mexico and Peru.226 Despite the event’s focus on Latin American and not Chile, 
the reasoning behind its inception was “an attempt to meet the new interest in U.S.-Latin 
American relations generated by the election in Chile of the world’s first Marxist 
president.”227While this was already the second year of the Allende government and not 
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quite a “new interest,” it was only a few months after the pivotal CALA conference. In 
the time following the conference it was impossible to discuss Latin America without 
focusing on Chile. This event is indicative of the shift towards focusing on Chile when 
referring to Latin America affairs, which was present throughout the U.S. due to the 
heighted fear of intervention.  
Of the CALA newsletters published between the conference in April 1972 and the 
coup in September 1973, only two issues did not have a story on Chile. The other nine 
issues either focused exclusively on Chile or primarily discussed Chile but had an article 
or two on a different Latin American country or on an ideology that applied to multiple 
Latin American nations.228The topics of CALA’s other initiatives were more widespread; 
the fall 1972 film series featured films on Brazil, Chile and Argentina and Bolivia.229 The 
following semester’s film series was rebranded as the Third World Cinema series and 
featured films on Cuba, Bolivia, Algeria, Mexico, South Africa and Chile.230 CALA’s 
annual conference on April 7, 1973 was titled, “Development for Liberation: Alternative 
Models for Latin America, Southern Africa and Wisconsin.”231Chile was discussed at the 
conference, but it was more focused “economic, political, social involvement of the U.S. 
in the affairs of Latin American countries,” and the relationship between these policies 
and other parts of the world.232While Chile was present in most of the educational 
material, CALA did stick to its mission to educate U.S. citizens about other Latin 
American affairs as well.  
                                                
228 CALA Newsletters. November 1971-September 1973, Folder 10, Box 2, M94-371, Community Action 
on Latin America Part 5: Additions, 1971-1999, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
229 “CALA News,” Ibero-American Newsletter 3,1 (Fall 1972): 2-3.  
230 “CALA Films,” Ibero-American Newsletter 3,2 (Winter 1973): 2.  
231 Conference Schedule, 1972, Folder 1, Box 2, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin America 
Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
232 Tentative Proposal for Conference, 1972, Folder 1, Box 2, Coll. Mss 491, Community Action on Latin 
America Records Part 1: Original Collection, 1971-1991, Wisconsin Historical Society.  
77  
“Is the Revolution Reversible?”233 
 Through direct action, education and the growing sense of peril surrounding the 
situation in Chile, NICH’s presence expanded throughout the country. There is evidence 
of chapters forming in Santa Barbara, Boston, Chicago and New York City, but the 
chapter in Berkeley was by far the most active outside of Madison. Bodenheimer, 
Farnsworth and Professor Donald Bray were a few of the leaders of the Berkeley chapter 
and had all been panelists at the April 1972 Chile conference. In fact, it was the NICH-
Berkeley chapter that suggested writing the letter of solidarity with French workers that a 
CALA-NICH member later penned in Madison.234 Some of NICH-Berkeley’s strength 
came from the large Chilean population in the area, which translated to greater numbers 
of people at large events. In April 1973, the Berkeley chapter organized a multi-media 
Chile festival at a community theater in San Francisco. The festival included music, 
dancing, films, book and record sales, a photography and poster art display and eight 
different workshops.235Farnsworth reported that during the two-day festival four hundred 
people came out on the first day and two hundred came on the second day. The chapter 
also taught a local class for adults at a leftist San Francisco school about Chile and Latin 
America in May and June of 1973. The class helped attract some new people to the 
chapter’s already consistent membership of ten and an additional ten “who come and 
go.”236 Although the Berkeley chapter did not have a large membership, it was still able 
to mobilize mass events such as the Chile festival and a demonstration outside of an ITT 
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subsidiary in downtown San Francisco in late June. This demonstration was in response 
to the attempted military coup in Chile on June 29, 1973.  NICH-Berkeley was able to 
quickly gather eighty people from many different groups in the area to join the march, 
which was covered by the local news and by five newspapers in Chile.237 
 As NICH continued to expand in Berkeley and across the nation, the situation in 
Chile became even more precarious. CALA-NICH members knew of the serious threats 
to Allende’s government but remained optimistic of the power of his revolution and what 
it stood for. The June 1973 edition of CALA’s newsletter was printed before the 
attempted coup and it was not until September 1973 that the next newsletter came out. 
That newsletter, “Chile, Is the Revolution Reversible?” featured an article with the same 
name that was written on August 28, 1973 by Ian Roxborough, a PhD candidate at the 
University of Wisconsin. He discussed the possibility of many coups or “even if this 
[coup] does not occur--since the strength and vigilance of the working class may prevent 
such an attempt to thwart the movement to liberate Chile from the shackles of dependent 
capitalism-- there exists the likelihood that the Socialist-Communist coalition will face a 
united owning class in the presidential election of 1976.”238 Roxborough identified the 
inflation caused by the U.S. credit blockade, which created a basis of opposition within 
the middle class as the reasoning behind a possible coup or electoral challenge. This 
opposition translated into mass demonstrations that created a climate of political 
instability and chaos, which in turn caused national polarization. “The more the capitalist 
class sees its interests threatened, the more radical are the measures it takes to oppose the 
government. The more overtly counterrevolutionary the capitalist opposition becomes, 
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the more the workers and peasants…respond with revolutionary countermeasures. And 
the more the reformists try to rely on the supposedly neutral military, the more the 
military itself become politicized.”239 
 Roxborough explained that the conditions that created the political situation in 
Chile and attempted to show that the situation would not be easily resolved. The 
economic situation in Chile had politicized the middle class to side with the right-wing 
“owning class.” Yet it was not just the middle class that had become polarized. The 
working class and peasantry had also become increasingly radical and were often upset 
with Allende’s more reformist position. This created strength in Allende’s leftist 
opposition and added to the chaos of the political environment.240 After acknowledging 
Allende’s many challenges, the article ends on an optimistic note. Not only had the UP’s 
share of the vote risen 6% in the 1973 congressional elections but “people had seen that a 
just society is possible…In this sense, the revolution is clearly irreversible.”241Despite 
predicting more coup attempts or a strong electoral opposition in the 1976 presidential 
election, CALA-NICH and Roxborough had faith in the power of justice, equality and 
anti-imperialism. The end of the article stated that only “the most draconian measures” 
could overturn this revolution.242 Such draconian measures came on September 11, 1973, 
fourteen days after this article was written. Allende was killed in a military coup that 
resulted in a seventeen-year military dictatorship led by Augusto Pinochet.  
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Conclusion 
 The coup on September 11, 1973 was the result of months of political and 
economic tension and polarization within Chile. The Nixon Administration’s credit 
blockade of Chile contributed to the destabilization of the economic situation in Chile, 
which exacerbated tensions between the middle class and the working class. While 
Allende had the broad support of the rural and working classes, the economic struggles 
led the middle class and to support rightwing and elite groups. Additionally, far-left 
militant groups who were opposed to Allende’s plan of a peaceful revolution served as 
further provocation for right-wing militant players and split Allende’s support amongst 
the rural and working classes as more radical factions joined the militant groups.243 The 
economic hardships and the fractioning of Allende’s left wing support helped set the 
stage for the volatile situation in Chile that preceded the coup. In the few months before 
the coup, Allende and his cabinet were aware of the possibility of a military coup, but 
believed that if the military were to split in that situation, enough people would stay loyal 
to the government and protect him.244  
In the few weeks before the coup, top officials in the Chilean armed forces were 
strengthening their plans against Allende. On September 1, despite opposition from the 
Allende government, Admiral Merino attempted to replaces Admiral Montero as the 
naval commander in chief. Merino claimed that parties, which supported the government, 
had infiltrated the navy and he feared that it would become a Marxist institution and 
therefore the change of command was necessary.245 On the 5, Merino recalls a heated 
exchange between himself and Allende in which he said, “we are at war with you. This 
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navy is at war because it is not communist and will never be communist…we will defend 
it to the last, it is our life and the life of our Chile.”246Merino and Allende met two days 
later in person but resolved little. By this time it was clear that a coup was on the horizon. 
Yet Allende was convinced that Augusto Pinochet and Gustavo Leigh, the commanders 
in chief of the army and air force respectively, would remain loyal to him. Their loyalty 
would severely limit the size and power of any attempted coup by Merino.247 Yet on 
September 9 both Pinochet and Leigh signed a note from Merino agreeing to “unite their 
forces in staging a coup on the eleventh.”248By the 10, the US embassy had been 
informed of the coup and the director of the CIA allegedly settled in to watch the coup 
from a room, which overlooked Allende’s office. According to a later report in an 
Argentinean newspaper, thirty-two U.S. planes arrived in Argentina on the border of 
Chile had arrived just a few days earlier. Evidence shows that U.S. agents in Chile were 
prepared to help out if their assistance was needed but when a “key officer” asked an U.S. 
official if the U.S. would provide military assistance if the situation became “difficult,” 
he refused to give a straight forward commitment.249   
As the military moved troops all day on the 10, “plotters within Chile’s armed 
forces successfully deflected government enquires about troop movements.”250By the 
evening of the 10 the rumors of troop movements had reached Allende in Santiago but 
after calling various military officials who ensured him that nothing was wrong Allende 
dismissed the rumors.251 He said, “We would not have slept for months if we had had to 
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attend to every rumor.”252Around 1:30am on the 11, a US defense official reported back 
to Washington that the coup would take place in a matter of hours. Allende did not hear 
this news until 6:00am and he was still unsure of who in the military had remained loyal 
to him. Upon hearing the news Allende headed straight to La Moneda, the presidential 
palace. While this coup was somewhat anticipated, the “ferocity” in which it was carried 
out was unexpected.253 
Allende’s final address to the Chilean people occurred as he was barricaded in La 
Moneda while refusing to surrender Santiago to the Chilean armed forces. “Placed in a 
historic transition, I will pay the people’s loyalty with my life. And I say to you that I’m 
certain that the seed we have sown in the dignified conscience of thousands and 
thousands of Chileans will not be shriveled forever…Long live Chile! Long live the 
People! Long live the workers!”254 Echoing the sentiments of the “Chile: Is the 
Revolution Reversible,” there was hope that despite the violent forces of the 
counterrevolution, that the message of Allende’s revolution would not die with him. As 
Allende refused to surrender Santiago or La Moneda to the military, the palace was 
surrounded by military troops and air force jets flew overhead and bombed the 
building.255 Allende died during this bombardment and it is still unknown if he 
committed suicide or if his death was the result of the bombing. Within a week Cuba’s 
representative to the United Nations accused Nixon of being “the intellectual author” of 
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the coup and countries around the world followed suit by blaming the U.S. for 
orchestrating the conditions for the coup.256 
As the junta government took over on September 11, Pinochet announced a 
national reconstruction as he disbanded congress and the constitution on national TV. 
Leigh and Merino had both envisioned reinstituting a constitutional government after the 
coup but were cast aside by Pinochet who would serve as the Chilean dictator until 
1990.257 Starting that evening, thousands of political prisoners were rounded up into the 
national stadium in Santiago where they were imprisoned, tortured and later sent to 
execution.258It is difficult to find correct numbers of those who were killed and 
“disappeared” in Chile, as many of these atrocities were committed unofficially. A 1974 
Amnesty International report on Chile estimated that within the first two weeks of the 
coup about 2,769 corpses were processed at a Santiago morgue. Yet an unofficial U.S. 
State Department report stated that the number was 10,800 by late December 1973.259 
Two U.S. citizens, Charles Horman a filmmaker and Frank Teruggi a student at the 
University of Chile who had been in touch with CALA activists in earlier years, both 
disappeared in Chile after the coup. Many have claimed that U.S. officials were 
indifferent if not complicit in their deaths.260 As the junta government rounded up and 
murdered blacklisted leftists, the State Department instructed U.S. officials to “discreetly 
convey Washington’s ‘desire to cooperate’ and ‘assist’” the new government.261 In 
private Kissinger argued “’however unpleasant’ the new government was [it was] ‘better 
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for us than Allende.’”262 As thousands of people were dying in Chile, the U.S. threw its 
support behind Pinochet and in response a movement against the junta government was 
growing in the U.S. 
The coup marked a shift of the centrality of NICH activism from Madison out to 
Berkeley. The Berkeley chapter coordinated most of the protests throughout California in 
the month following the coup. NICH-Berkeley worked in coordination with the other 
NICH chapters but became disconnected from CALA and the Madison chapter. In the 
first Ibero-American Newsletter published the University of Wisconsin after the coup 
there was a mention of a new organization “Madison Committee to Help Chile” which 
had mobilized to raise money to help find employment for Chilean scholars in exile. The 
published paragraph on CALA events for the upcoming semester did not mention NICH 
or the coup.263 It mentioned the schedule for the film festival and for its national 
conference in November on “Repression and Development in Brazil.” It appears that 
CALA and NICH divided almost immediately after the coup.264 Post-coup activism 
similar to NICH sprouted out throughout the nation, as seen with the Madison Committee 
to Help Chile, but the Madison NICH chapter appeared to dissolve and NICH and CALA 
separated their affiliation for one another.  
On November 1, NICH published its first Chile Newsletter with a statement on 
NICH’s proposed actions against the junta government. It stated that NICH would 
continue to expose U.S. involvement in Chile and educate people about the merits of 
Allende’s government. NICH would also expose the U.S.’s efforts in overthrowing 
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Allende and “intensity its efforts to halt further U.S. intervention now necessary to prop 
up yet another unpopular military dictatorship.”265The Chile Newsletter was intended to 
inform people about the developing situation in Chile and was to be used as a 
coordinating tool between local and national activist groups. This was especially 
important in the earliest month of the coup as national groups were just starting to 
organize.266 
The first Chile Newsletter also outlined the actions that were taken in response to 
the coup in September and October, as well as some new campaigns for individuals to 
partake in. Immediately following the coup “rallies of solidarity” took place in cities 
across the world, followed by teach-ins and meetings to mobilize people on the issue. An 
International Week of Solidarity with Chile was sponsored in about thirty-five U.S. cities 
on October 8-14. NICH reported that thousands of people had attended rallies along the 
whole West Coast from San Diego to Seattle, including the 1,000 individuals in San 
Francisco who came out on October 4 for a memorial poetry reading for Allende.267 
NICH-Berkeley coordinated many of the teach-ins, meetings and film series throughout 
Northern California and acted as a resource for any communities or individuals 
throughout the country that wanted to get involved in Chilean solidarity activism.268 
NICH also warned readers that ‘the junta could no more survive without U.S. aid than 
could the Allende government” so it launched a campaign for individuals to contact the 
congressional committee on Chilean aid to advocate against the U.S. sending money to 
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the junta government.269In addition to coordinating national rallies and campaigns NICH 
used the newsletter to inform U.S. citizens of developments in Chile. In the later years 
NICH organized a network to help political prisoners by publishing a Political Prisoners 
Bulletin in addition to the Chile Newsletter.270 NICH continued to play a role in the 
prominent solidarity movement against Pinochet’s regime that emerged after the coup.  
While the post-coup movement was more successful and widespread than the 
solidarity movement that CALA-NICH led during Allende’s presidency, the impact of 
the latter movement has been ignored and mischaracterized by historians. One article 
describes the pre-coup movement as “a small group of leftists who embraced the Unidad 
Popular.”271While that statement is accurate it belittles the achievements of the movement 
and does not acknowledge the root of CALA-NICH’s activism. CALA-NICH activists 
did in fact embrace the Allende government but the movement emerged as a response to 
the war in Vietnam and continued U.S. imperialism, not an infatuation with Allende’s 
socialist revolution. Most of the founders of CALA had been activists in the anti-war 
movement and had been on campus during the height of its activity. As the antiwar 
movement’s activism began slowing down in the early 1970s, the founders of CALA 
looked to other global areas that were in danger of becoming the next Vietnam. These 
individuals were concerned about the long history of U.S. imperialism in Latin America 
and joined together in Madison, Wisconsin to attempt to stop “another Vietnam.” CALA 
believed that if the U.S. masses had been exposed to the information about U.S. 
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imperialism in Vietnam that the war may have been prevented. In that vein CALA 
worked to inform the people about Latin America and the role that U.S. imperialism 
played in oppressing Latin Americans as a preemptive measure to save the U.S. from 
another disastrous war. As the ITT memos were exposed in the media and more was 
learned about the Nixon administrations actions in Chile, NICH was founded to inform 
people about the dangers of intervention in Chile. NICH became a more focused version 
of CALA and worked to prevent a subversion of democracy and another Vietnam war in 
Chile. It was the influence of the Vietnam war and the antiwar movement, which planted 
the seed for CALA and NICH’s anti-imperialist activism in Latin America. 
Although CALA-NICH’s activism was sandwiched between two prominent 
activist movements, the antiwar movement and the post-coup solidarity with Chile 
movement, it never reached the same momentum as its predecessor or successor 
movements. Yet the network that CALA-NICH had built during the years of the Allende 
government were instrumental in facilitating the quick mobilization of solidarity with 
Chile immediately after the coup. NICH already had resources on U.S. interventions in 
Chile, connections with other anti-imperialist groups (both Latin America-focused and 
not) and chapters in several cities. These factors put NICH on the forefront of this new 
movement that had emerged out of the coup. NICH worked closely with NACLA and 
groups with similar missions such as Common Front for Latin America (COFFLA) to 
ensure that Chile became a central issue for activists in the U.S.272 As a general Latin 
America-focused group, COFFLA understood the effect that this coup would have on all 
the whole region. It immediately urged all other Latin America-focused solidarity groups 
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to “organize themselves and promote Non-Intervention in Chile (NICH) coalitions for 
mobilizing short run impact activity,” as well as coordinate other U.S. activists groups to 
take up the Chilean cause.273 As NICH was the largest solidarity group focused on Chile 
before the coup its existing infrastructure, comprehensive understanding of the situation, 
and access to resources on Chile made NICH essential for the post-coup’s initial 
response. COFFLA recognized that a strong initial response to the coup would help 
generate a more sustainable long-term movement and attract a broad coalition of activists 
from other U.S. solidarity groups, Latin America focused and not. This strategy was 
effective, as over one hundred diverse activists groups joined the post-coup movement by 
the end of 1973 including the United Auto Workers and the Black Panther Party.274  In 
Heidi Tinsman’s book on the post-coup boycott of Chilean grapes, she lists NICH as one 
of the few major groups that had “national scope” in this movement.275 With over fifteen 
chapters throughout the nation, the Chile newsletter and the political prisoners bulletin, 
NICH remained an influential presence in coordinating solidarity efforts as the movement 
continued to expand up into the 1980s.  
CALA-NICH’s form of activism was not just influential for the post-coup 
solidarity with Chile movement; it was an influential force in 1970s activism more 
broadly. Much of the 1970s activism was marked by consumer boycotts that arose from 
specific concerns about corporate responsibility and the perpetuation of dependency in 
developing nations. This included campaigns against the support of Pinochet’s regime, 
South Africa’s apartheid and marketing techniques in developing countries by Nestlé and 
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pesticide, alcohol, and tobacco companies.276 For CALA-NICH anti-corporate activism 
was an inherent part of its anti-imperialist activism and it was manifested in Gedicks’s in-
depth research on Kennecott’s role in the perpetuation of dependency in Chile and 
Wisconsin and in its boycott and campaigns against ITT. The idea of consumer boycotts 
linked new left ideals of participatory democracy with CALA-NICH’s commitment to 
community initiatives. While boycotts became prolific in the 1970s there had been 
instances of notable boycott campaigns in earlier years. SDS was engaged in several 
boycotts including one in 1969 against Standard Oil’s treatment of union workers and the 
Union of Farm Workers (UFW), led by César Chávez and Dolores Huerta, organized 
boycotts of California grapes in the 1960s to protest poor working conditions.277 Yet it 
was not until the 1970s that targeted corporate boycotts and the focus on global corporate 
harm in relation to imperialism and dependency became a trademark of activism. Robin 
Broad and Zahara Heckscher point to the ITT controversy in Chile as the “poster child” 
for the “increasing concerns over TNCs’ [transnational corporations] economic and 
political power vis-à-vis Third World governments” that arose in the 1970s.278 CALA-
NICH was on the forefront of this new pattern of activism that would have a lasting 
impact for future generations.  
Boycotts of corporations as well as of the Chilean government played a prominent 
role in the post-coup movement. A month after the coup NICH met up with NACLA and 
several other groups to discuss the need for a boycotts against Chilean and U.S. 
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businesses that had played a role in overthrowing Allende, such as ITT. By November 
1973, the San Francisco area’s International Longshore and Warehouse Union declared 
that they would not unload any Chilean products.279 While this boycott was not especially 
effective, the “boycott stance became an important rallying point and central theme for 
the emerging Chile solidarity movement.” In 1979 groups began organizing a consumer 
boycott of Chilean grapes and wine.280 With the renewed economic relationship between 
the U.S. and Chile after the coup Chilean grape exports to the U.S. increases rapidly. By 
1975 Chile had begun exporting about 80 percent of its grapes to the U.S. Similar to the 
earlier Longshore and Warehouse Union boycott, this consumer boycott had little 
economic effect on the Pinochet regime but it did tie together an economic critique of 
Pinochet’s policies to the moral critique. Rather than simply denouncing the overt human 
rights abuses of the Chilean junta, these activists wanted to focus “on the regime’s 
economic policies that were wrecking havoc by exposing Chile to extremes of 
international capitalism.”281This boycott raised awareness about the dramatic levels of 
poverty and unemployment that Pinochet’s government was producing because of its 
obsession with the U.S.-Chilean economic relations that bread dependency and economic 
inequality.282 This type of boycott, inspired by economic critiques of imperialist and 
dependent policies that CALA-NICH had participated in, was prominent in 1970s 
activism.   
 While dependency theory was developed in reference to Latin America the theory 
was soon applied to developing nations across the world. This was reflected in anti-
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corporate campaigns of the 1970s that emerged in nations outside of Latin America. In 
1977 a boycott was launched against the Swiss corporation, Nestlé, for its marketing 
techniques of baby formula in developing countries. According to a New York Times 
article from 1981, “the advertisements usually promised, if only subtly, that formula was 
the modern method of infant feeding, associated with upward mobility.”283 Formula can 
be a safe alternative to breast milk under the right conditions but Nestlé targeted women 
who were often not able to get access to clean water or refrigeration or could not buy 
enough formula to sustain their infant. Under these conditions the baby formula was 
dangerous and caused many infants in the developing world to suffer from 
malnourishment and other illnesses.284The boycott attracted a diverse group of activists 
from people concerned about child healthcare, world hunger to the power that 
corporations wielded in the developing world. This boycott lasted seven years and was 
instrumental in the development of the World Health Organization’s international code 
about marketing for baby formulas.285 It also “had a major impact on the interpretation of 
corporate accountability and the reconciliation of human rights and commercial 
interests.”286 This boycott of Nestlé was just one of many consumer boycotts organized in 
the U.S. and Europe during the 1970s to address the issue of corporate interests trumping 
considerations for the safety and welfare of those living in poverty in developing 
countries. CALA-NICH’s activism in the early 1970s was on the forefront of this anti-
corporate activism as anti-imperialist activism that stemmed from a critique of 
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dependency theory. This activism took the form of boycotts against economic policies of 
abusive regimes, such as the boycott of Chilean grapes and against specific corporations 
that were benefiting through unlawful intervention and the exploitation of those in 
poverty in the developing world. The latter campaigns were exemplified by CALA-
NICH’s boycott of ITT subsidiaries in Chile and Vietnam and the Nestlé boycott.   
  Ultimately CALA-NICH did not succeed in its goal of stopping U.S. intervention 
from subverting democracy in Chile nor did it end U.S. imperialism in Latin America. 
Yet CALA-NICH was an essential part of the post-coup movement’s initial mobilization 
efforts and NICH continued to be an influential presence in the movement through the 
1980s. This movement also played a significant role in Latin American activism and in 
the shift towards the anti-corporate activism that would mark the 1970s and 1980s. When 
evaluating CALA-NICH’s role in broader trends of 1970s activism, CALA-NICH was on 
the forefront of the growing view of anti-corporate activism as anti-imperialism. This 
view of targeting and boycotting specific corporations for their role in perpetuating 
dependency and of exploiting people in the developing world would have a lasting 
impact on activism in the U.S. The story of CALA-NICH also sheds light on the moral 
stain that U.S. interventions in Chile and Latin America have left on our society. These 
political maneuvers have caused immense amounts of trauma to the people of Latin 
America. Therefore we must join in and support those who speak out against global and 
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